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Abstract
This thesis studies the importance of non-fundamental factors in economic and financial
fluctuations. In particular, it studies how the economy responds to changes in expectations
about economic fundamentals, independently of actual changes in those fundamentals,
and to what extent financial fluctuations in one country spillover to other countries.
The first chapter investigates how the economy reacts to the arrival of news about
future technological progress. I find that the economy expands following a so-called news
shock, but the bulk of the effect is delayed until technology starts to actually improve.
News shocks explain around 30 percent of business cycle fluctuations, while their role is
more important for explaining variations in forward-looking variables, such as stock prices
and the term spread.
In the second chapter, jointly written with Stephane De´es, studies the importance of
animal spirits - defined as changes in expectations not supported by changes in fundamen-
tals - for producing business cycles. We find that animal spirits are more important for
business cycle fluctuations than permanent shocks. We use a novel identification scheme
in a vector-autoregressive framework that exploits the fact that the econometrician has a
richer data-set than consumers.
In the third chapter, jointly written with Roberto De Santis, studies the extent and
direction of spillovers, contagion and connectedness in European and US sovereign debt
markets from 2005 to 2014. We use a new method that allows us to identify orthogonal
country specific shocks in a panel of countries, employing restrictions on the relative size of
the contemporaneous impact effect. We find that connectedness declined steadily between
2009 and 2012, indicating increased financial fragmentation. We find that Greece was a
key source of systemic risk in 2010, explaining 20-30% of the variance of sovereign yields
in stressed countries, while in 2011-2012 Italy, not Spain, was a key source of systemic
risk.
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Introduction
The drivers of economic and financial fluctuations are one of the central topics studied
in economic research. In the last three decades mainstream economic literature has em-
phasized supply side factors - like technological changes - as the most important drivers
of economic fluctuations. However, in recent years demand side factors have regained
attention in the profession. In particular, the notion that changes in expectations about
economic fundamentals, independently of actual changes in those fundamentals, may be
an important factor causing business cycles gained increasing attention. This thesis stud-
ies the importance of such non-fundamental factors in producing economic and financial
fluctuations.
The first chapter investigates how the economy reacts to the arrival of news about
future technological progress. To study the effects of so-called news shocks in the data I use
information contained in the term spread. The term spread is a difference between long-
term and short-term yields and it was well known, especially among economic forecasters,
that its movements are useful for predicting changes in economic activity. Building on
these insights I show that in a standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model
the surprise increase in technology decreases the term spread, while when technology
is only expected to increase in the future the term spread increases. The theoretical
predictions serve to rationalize a sign restriction identification scheme to obtain news
shocks in the data. I find that the economy expands following a news shock, but the
bulk of the effect is delayed until technology starts to actually improve. News shocks
explain around 30 percent of business cycle fluctuations, while their role is more important
for explaining variations in forward-looking variables, such as stock prices and the term
spread.
Changes in expectations may be caused by factors other than the arrival of news
about future technological progress. For example, spells of optimism may be caused
by misperceptions about potential long-term economic growth or misperceptions about
the performance of firms on the stock exchange. In the second chapter, jointly written
with Stephane De´es, we study the importance of animal spirits - defined as changes in
expectations not supported by changes in fundamentals - for producing business cycles.
We propose a novel econometric methodology that allows us to study the effects of animal
spirits without imposing too much structure on the data. We find that animal spirits -
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in the model defined as noise shocks - are more important for business cycle fluctuations
than permanent shocks - in the model defined as technology shocks.
In the third chapter, which is a result of collaboration with Roberto De Santis, we turn
our attention to financial markets. During the Eurozone debt crisis it became clear that
the problems of one country can endanger the whole Eurozone, despite most countries
having relatively sound economic fundamentals. We provide a first step in understanding
those events by studying the extent and direction of spillovers, contagion and connected-
ness in European and US sovereign debt markets from 2005 to 2014. We propose a new
identification method that allows us to identify orthogonal country specific shocks. The
proposed method generates more intuitive results compared to previous methods, since
it shows that Greece was a key source of systemic risk in 2010, while previous methods
suggest the role of Greece declined in this period. Moreover, we find that connectedness,
defined as the variation of asset prices in one country stemming from shocks in asset mar-
kets of another country, declined steadily between 2009 and 2012, indicating increased
financial fragmentation during the Eurozone’s debt crisis.
2
Chapter 1
Can the Term Spread Reveal the
Effect of News Shocks?
1.1 Introduction
In the last decade, the notion that news about future technological progress may have sig-
nificant effects on business cycles has attracted a lot of attention. Previously, economists
demonstrated the role of the term spread - defined as the difference between long-term
and short-term yields - for predicting changes in economic activity. Despite the clear link
between the two topics, the two strands of the literature evolved independently. This
paper explicitly connects these two related topics. I show that the movements in the term
spread can be generated by both standard surprise TFP shocks and anticipated TFP news
shocks. Using this insight and the information contained in the term spread, I explore
the effect that news has in the US economy.
The idea that business cycles can be generated by expectations about future techno-
logical changes can be found in Pigou [1926]. For the next 80 years the idea faded from
the mainstream business cycle literature until it was recently revived by Beaudry and
Portier [2006]. They show empirically that news shocks can cause business cycles, and
that they account for more than half of output fluctuations. The ‘news’ literature has
since expanded rapidly.
The theoretical literature has focused primarily on the fact that real business cycle
(RBC) models cannot generate news driven business cycles, i.e. increase in consumption,
investment, hours and output, following a positive news shock. Beaudry and Portier
[2007] show how the RBC model can be modified in order to produce this result. The
same goal was achieved in Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009], using a different modification to
the standard model. These authors extend the closed economy in Jaimovich and Rebelo
[2008] to an open economy environment.
There is no consensus about the empirical effects of news shocks, especially about
3
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the short-run response of output and investment to news shocks and about the relative
importance of news shocks in producing business cycles. On the one hand, Beaudry
and Portier [2006] and Beaudry and Lucke [2010] find that positive news shocks have an
expansionary effect on the economy, and that news shocks account for a large share of
business cycle fluctuations. The same finding is also reported by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
[2012], who estimate a full structural model. On the other hand, Barsky and Sims [2011]
and Forni et al. [2011] find that news shocks cause investment and output to decrease
and consumption to increase, therefore supporting the predictions of the standard RBC
models.
Closest to this paper is the empirical work of Kurmann and Otrok [2013]. To the best
of my knowledge, they were the first to note the relation between information contained
in the term spread and news shocks. Namely, they extract the shock that explains most
of the fluctuations in the term spread and show that this shock is closely related to TFP
news shocks. However, their work lacks a theoretical foundation for why news shocks can
cause movements in the term spread. They also do not establish the relation between the
standard surprise TFP shock and the term spread.
This paper contributes to both the theoretical and empirical strands of the ‘news’
literature. On the theoretical side, I show that the term spread depends crucially on
the expected change in the marginal utility of consumption. This conclusion, initially
obtained in a simple model, is confirmed in a general DSGE framework. In the model
the term spread arises endogenously: a positive surprise TFP shock decreases the term
spread on impact, while a positive news shock is accompanied by an increase in the term
spread. 1
The main empirical contribution of this paper is a novel strategy to extract the news
shock. The fact that there are different responses of the term spread to the surprise
and the news TFP shocks enables me to identify both shocks using a sign restriction
identification scheme. In contrast, previous empirical studies exploring the effect of the
news shock apply restrictions to TFP data in order to separate the surprise and the news
TFP shock. This is problematic since TFP data is an artificial construct and therefore
prone to large measurement errors that can affect empirical inference.
I show that the effects of my identified news shocks are in line with predictions from
standard DSGE models. News shocks are important in producing cyclical fluctuations at
medium term horizons, but their instantaneous effect on output and investment is quan-
titatively small. The instantaneous response of output and investment depends on the
identification restrictions used. The news shocks account for about 30 percent of business
cycle fluctuations in the real economy, while standard surprise TFP shocks account for
1The increase of the term spread after the positive news shock is in line with previous empirical work
that found that the term spread is useful for economic forecasting. A good overview can be found in
Wheelock et al. [2009].
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about 50 percent. The quantitative importance of the news shock in producing business
cycles is therefore smaller than in Beaudry and Portier [2006]. Yet cycles of some variables
such as stock prices and the term spread are, to a large extent, attributed to the news
shock.
Section 1.2 describes a benchmark model in which I show how the movements of
the term spread arise. In the next section, I extend the results to a standard DSGE
model. Section 1.4 presents the empirical model and identification strategy. In Section
1.5 I present the main results and in Section 1.6 I check the robustness of these results.
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 What affects the term spread?
This section provides intuition about the interaction between the term spread and macroe-
conomic fluctuations. Using the framework discussed in Ljungqvist and Sargent [2004], I
show under what conditions the response of the term spread is positive or negative fol-
lowing exogenous shocks. This serves to explain why and how the term spread reacts to
the news shock and the surprise TFP shock.
Consider two kinds of risk-free bonds, a one-period and a two-period bond. The budget
constraints in period t and t+ 1 are:
ct +R
−1
1,tB1,t +R
−1
2,tB2,t + yt ≥ Wt (1.2.1)
Wt+1 = B1,t +R
−1
1,t+1B2,t + yt+1 (1.2.2)
where ct is consumption, yt is an exogenous income and Wt is wealth. R
−1
1,t is the price
of the one-period bond B1,t, a perfectly riskless claim to one unit of consumption at time
t+ 1. Similarly R−12,t is the time t price of the two-period bond, a perfectly riskless claim
to one unit of consumption at time t+ 2. Agents are allowed to sell the two-period bond
before it matures, but its price in the next period, R−11,t+1, is unknown and thus this bong
is subject to price risk prior to maturity. In time t + 1, the price R−11,t+1 follows from
a simple arbitrage condition - a two-period bond in period t + 1 represents an identical
claim as a one-period bond issued in period t+ 1.
The first-order necessary condition with respect to B1,t is:
R−11,t = βEt
[
u
′
(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]
(1.2.3)
which is a standard Euler equation. The price of a risk-free bond is obtained by equalizing
the marginal loss of today’s consumption from purchasing the bond to the discounted
expected marginal gain of tomorrow’s consumption from selling the bond.
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The first-order necessary condition with respect to B2,t is:
R−12,t = βEt
[
u
′
(ct+1)
u
′
(ct)
R−11,t+1
]
= β2Et
[
u
′
(ct+2)
u
′
(ct)
] (1.2.4)
where the second equality uses the fact that R−11,t+1 = βEt+1
[
u
′
(ct+2)/u
′
(ct+1)
]
and the
law of iterated expectations. Similarly, it can be shown that:
R−1j,t = β
jEt
[
u
′
(ct+j)
u′(ct)
]
(1.2.5)
which is a general expression for the price of j-period bond. In order to define the term
spread, I rewrite the price of j-period bond in terms of one-year yield on this instrument.
For a zero-coupon bond, the yield to maturity is:
R∗j,t ≡ R1/jj,t = β−1
[
u
′
(ct)
Etu
′(ct+j)
]1/j
(1.2.6)
I define the term spread, TSt, as the ratio between the 1-year yield of a k-year and a
j-year bond:
TSt ≡
R∗k,t
R∗j,t
=
β−1
(
u
′
(ct)[Etu
′
(ct+k)]
−1)1/k
β−1 (u′(ct)[Etu
′(ct+j)]−1)
1/j
(1.2.7)
When the ratio is larger than one the term spread is positive and when the ratio is less
than one the term spread is negative.2 In the next two propositions, I define conditions
determining the sign of the term spread.
Proposition 1. The term spread equals zero when the expected growth rate of marginal
utility is constant, independent of the growth rate.
Proof. in Appendix in Section A.2.
2In the empirical section, the term spread is defined as the difference between the yields of the bonds
of different maturities.
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Proposition 2.
i.) The term spread is positive when the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of
consumption is decreasing over time, and it is negative when the expected growth rate
of the marginal utility of consumption is increasing over time.
ii.) The term spread is positive when the expected decay of the marginal utility of con-
sumption is increasing in time and the term spread is negative when the expected
decay of the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing with time.
Proof. in Appendix in Section A.2.
1.2.1 The term spread and news shocks
The link between the term spread and news and surprise TFP shocks may not be evident
from Propositions 1 and 2. To clarify this, assume a standard CES utility, ut =
c1−σt
1−σ .
Log-linearizing equation (1.2.7) we have:3
T˜ St = −σ
k
c˜t +
σ
k
Et[c˜t+k] +
σ
j
c˜t − σ
j
Et[c˜t+j] (1.2.8)
where x˜t is the deviation of the log of xt from its steady state value. Let Etct+1 = ρct,
where ρ = r+ 1 and where r is the growth rate of consumption. We can now forecast the
values in equation (1.2.8):
Etct+k = ερ
kct → Et[c˜t+k] = ln(ε) + k ln(ρ) + c˜t
Etct+j = ρ
jct → Et[c˜t+j] = j ln(ρ) + c˜t
(1.2.9)
where ε allows the growth rate of consumption between periods t and t+ k to differ from
the growth rate of consumption between periods t and t+j. Inserting the expected values
from equation (1.2.9) into equation (1.2.8), we get:
T˜ St = ln(ε) (1.2.10)
which implies that the term spread in this setup depends only on the difference between
the expected growth rates of consumption. Whenever ε is equal to one - whenever the
expected growth rate of consumption is constant - the term spread is zero. An increasing
growth rate of consumption, ε > 1, implies that the term spread is positive, while the
term spread is negative for the decreasing growth rate of consumption.
The first and second panels of Figure 1.1 show the response of consumption following
a news shock and a surprise TFP respectively. The news shock is assumed to anticipate
the TFP shock five periods ahead. I assume the short-term bond matures in one period,
3Log-linearizing equation 1.2.7 implies that the variance and higher moments of consumption do not
matter for evaluating the expected value of marginal utility, which simplifies the presentation.
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j = 1, while the long-term bond matures in five periods, k = 5. The news shock and the
surprise ‘TFP’ shock in this model are shocks to the income process.
Given that the supply of bonds is fixed and the agent does not have any other assets to
finance the increase of consumption, consumption stays unchanged until the news shock
is realized as an actual increase in income. In other words, only in the fifth period,
when the anticipated increase in income actually materializes, does consumption increase
considerably.
Figure 1.1: IRF of consumption for the surprise TFP and the news shock
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The dashed line shows the value of ε. After the news shock ε is above one and thus
the term spread is positive. In this simplified model the result is straightforward: the
growth rate of consumption between periods t and t + 1 is zero, while the growth rate
of consumption between period t and t + 5 is positive. Thus ε > 1 due to the higher
expected growth rate of consumption and the term spread is positive. To the best of
my knowledge, all DSGE models available in the literature are characterized by a mild
increase of consumption immediately after the news shock and a large increase after the
news shock actually realizes as an increase of TFP. This acceleration of consumption
implies that the news shock increases the term spread.
In the benchmark model, due to the absence of alternative assets, consumption is
a one-to-one function of the income process. Therefore, the response of consumption
following a standard TFP shock simply follows the assumed income process. After the
shock, the income process and consumption follow an exponential decay, implying that
ε = 1. Thus, the term spread is equal to zero in all periods.
The one-to-one relationship between the income process and consumption is altered
with the introduction of capital to the model. As can be seen in the third panel in Figure
1.1, consumption now increases on impact to the TFP shock, but in the next periods the
8
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decay of consumption increases. The increasing decay implies ε < 1 and thus a negative
term spread.
In general, the effect of the two shocks will depend on the assumed utility function.
The utility function determines how increases in the level of consumption, and possibly
labor, translate into the marginal utility on which the interest rate depends. The behavior
of the term spread also crucially depends on the assumed maturities used to construct the
term spread. When the period in which the news shock is realized as an actual increase
of TFP, t + p, is between the maturities of short-term and long-term bond, j < p < k,
the term spread is more likely to increase after the news shock. This was the case in the
model illustrated above, which implied that the term spread always increased following
the news shock, regardless of the other parameters of the model.
1.3 The Model
The model presented in this section is a standard DSGE model with the addition of some
non-standard features. The first of these is the presence of bonds with different maturities.
Secondly, I add the modifications, like utility characterized by a low wealth effect, that
are typically used in the news literature, for example in Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009].
With these modifications the model becomes more flexible as different combinations of
the parameters imply different responses of the model’s variables to the news shock.
1.3.1 Household
The household maximizes their expected lifetime utility, discounting the future by β, sub-
ject to a budget constraint. The household’s utility depends positively on consumption,
Ct, and negatively on hours worked, Nt:
U(C,N) = Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Ct − ψN θtXt)1−ω
1− ω (1.3.1)
where
Xt = C
γ
t X
1−γ
t−1 (1.3.2)
The ‘non-standard’ form of the utility function was introduced by Jaimovich and Rebelo
[2009]. The presence of the variable Xt implies that the preferences are not time-separable
and are characterized by a low wealth effect which depends on the parameter γ. The
strength of the wealth effect crucially affects the response of the model to the news shock
and will be discussed below.4
4The specification of utility in 1.3.1 nests two special cases of utility functions commonly used in the
real business cycle literature; when γ = 0, we obtain the preferences proposed in Greenwood et al. [1988],
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The budget constraint is given by:
Ct + It + τt +
N∑
q=1
Bq,t = WtNt +QtKt−1 +
N∑
q=1
Rq,t−qBq,t−q − Φ(N) (1.3.3)
Purchases of consumption, Ct, investment, It, lump-sum taxes, τt and bonds of maturity
1 to N,
∑N
q=1Bq,t, are financed by labor income, WtNt, income from invested capital,
QtKt−1 and interest payments on outstanding bonds,
∑N
q=1Rq,t−qBq,t−q.
The law of motion for capital is:
Kt = It + (1− δ)Kt−1 (1.3.4)
where δ is a depreciation rate.
I assume a quadratic labor adjustment cost:
Φ(N) =
φn
2
(Nt −Nt−1)2 (1.3.5)
The presence and size of the labor adjustment cost crucially affects the response of the
labor supply to the news shock, as will be seen below.
1.3.2 Firm
The competitive firm uses a standard Cobb-Douglas production function to produce the
final goods for consumption:
Ft(K,N) = ZtK
α
t−1N
1−α
t (1.3.6)
where Zt is TFP and follows a first order auto-regressive process:
ln(Zt) = ρ ln(Zt−1) + ζt−p + t (1.3.7)
where t is a standard unanticipated technology shock. The news shock, ζt−p, is modeled as
an anticipated TFP shock, which is realized p periods ahead. The maximization problem
of a firm yields:
Qt = αZtK
α−1
t−1 N
1−α
t (1.3.8)
Wt = (1− α)ZtKαt−1N−αt (1.3.9)
where Qt is the return to capital and Wt is the wage.
which are known as the GHH preferences. The main propriety of the GHH preferences is the absence
of the wealth effect, as labor supply only depends on the real wage. On the other hand, when γ = 1,
we obtain the preferences proposed in King et al. [1988]. In this case, when θ = 1 the utility function
corresponds to utility of the form U(C) = ln(C) + ψln(1−N).
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The equilibrium condition for stock prices, SPt, is:
SPt = EtMt(Yt+1 + SPt+1) (1.3.10)
where Mt is a stochastic discount factor defined as:
Mt = β
u
′
(ct+1)
u′(ct)
(1.3.11)
where u
′
(ct) is the marginal utility from consumption. In equilibrium the stock price will
be equal to:
SPt =
∞∑
s=1
βsYt+s (1.3.12)
1.3.3 Government
The government budget constraint is:
τt +
N∑
q=1
Bq,t = Gt +
N∑
q=1
Rq,t−qBq,t−q (1.3.13)
The government issues a full set of bonds with maturities q ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ] and levies a
lump-sum tax, τt, to finance unproductive government consumption, Gt, and interest
payments. In order to close the model, I assume the following rules for government debt
and consumption expenditure:
Gt = gg
[
Yt+l
Yss
]γg
(1.3.14)
Bq,t = gb
[
Yt+l
Yss
]γb
for q ∈ [1, 2, ..., N ] (1.3.15)
where gb is the steady state quantity of bonds of maturity N, and gg is the steady state
value of government consumption. Yss represents the steady state value of output. When-
ever l > 0, the government reacts to expected output. This allows the government a more
active role in the case of a news shock. The extent of the government’s reaction is captured
by the parameters γb and γg. When γb = 0 the supply of bonds is fixed and when γb = 1
the ratio of government debt over output is fixed. For positive values of γb, government
reaction is pro-cyclical, while for negative values government reaction is counter-cyclical.
The same holds true for government consumption.
11
1.3. The Model
1.3.4 Baseline parameterization
In this subsection, I present the baseline parameterization of the model to explain the
main mechanisms in the model. In the next subsection, I use different combinations of
parameters to show the robustness of the term spread’s response in the model.
The baseline parameter values are shown in Table A.2. ‘Standard’ parameters, such
as the discount factor and the share of capital in production, are set to values commonly
used in the literature. Turning to ‘non-standard’ parameters, the parameter γ, which
controls the size of the wealth effect, is set to one, meaning that the wealth effect is the
strongest. In the baseline specification, I assume the supply of bonds and government
consumption expenditures are fixed: γb = 0 and γg = 0. Finally, the long-term bonds are
assumed to have a maturity of five periods, N = 5, and the news shock is assumed to
anticipate the TFP shock four periods in advance, p = 4. The term spread is constructed
as the ratio between the annualized interest rate on a five-period bond and the interest
rate on a one-period bond.
The responses to the surprise TFP and the news shock are presented in Figures A.1
and A.2. The responses of macro variables after the surprise TFP shock are standard -
output, consumption and investment all increase after the a positive shock to TFP. At
the same time, stock prices and labor supply also increase. The most interesting result
concerns the response of the term spread; as expected from the discussion in Section 1.2,
the term spread decreases following the TFP shock.
The model presented in this paper also reproduces standard results with regard to the
response of macro variables to the news shock. While consumption increases after the
news shock, the news shock generates a drop in output and investment, a common result in
standard DSGE models. The result is a consequence of the wealth effect and consumption
smoothing. The news shock increases the expected lifetime income and therefore, via the
wealth effect, tends to depress the labor supply. At the same time, due to consumption
smoothing, investment becomes negative and therefore the marginal productivity of labor
decreases slightly. The decrease of labor supply and investment implies output decreases
on impact. A lower wealth effect and labor adjustment costs would lead to increases in
output following the news shock. This will be considered in the next section. Stock prices
also increase after the news shock.
The most relevant result is that the term spread increases following the news shock.
As explained above, the result is the consequence of the expected increase of the growth
rate of consumption. Here we see that this continues to hold with the non-separable
utility specification.
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1.3.5 Robustness to the change of parameters
In this section I show that the response of the term spread as predicted in Section 1.2
is robust to different parameter values. Different combinations of parameters imply a
different response from some variables, such as output, to the news shock. However, the
response of the term spread to the news shock is qualitatively unaffected by changing
parameter values.
I consider the following combinations of parameters:
• Wealth effect: γ ∈ [0.001, 0.5, 1]
• Government’s debt reaction: γb ∈ [−1, 0, 1]
• Government’s consumption reaction: γg ∈ [−1, 0, 1]
• Labor adjustment cost: ψn ∈ [0, 20, 200]
• Persistence of technology: ρ ∈ [0.7, 0.9]
The impulse responses for all the models (3× 3× 3× 3× 2 = 162) are shown in Figures
A.3 and A.4. Focusing on the responses to the news shock, we can see that the response
of output to the news shock can be positive or negative depending on parameters. The
most important parameters for the response of output are the parameter γ, controlling
the strength of the wealth effect, and the labor adjustment cost parameter ψn, controlling
the response of labor supply. Consider the combinations when γ = 0.001 and ψn = 200.
Due to the convex labor adjustment cost, labor supply starts to increase immediately
after the news shock, lowering the costs associated with the increase of labor supply. The
increase of labor is further eased by the fact that the wealth effect is low and therefore
the increase of the expected lifetime income does not work strongly to depress the labor
supply. As a consequence of the increased labor supply, output increases.
Similar explanations can be considered when the reaction of the government is changed.
For example, when government debt reacts pro-cyclically to the news shock, this implies
agents have to give up some consumption in order to buy bonds. The increase of agents’
savings depresses the increase of consumption following the news shock.
The response of macroeconomic variables to the news shock thus depend on the com-
binations of parameters. This is not the case for the response of the term spread to the
news shock. Figure A.4 shows that regardless of the combination of parameters, the qual-
itative response of the term spread does not change - the term spread increases following
the news shock. Furthermore, the response of the term spread is qualitatively robust
also in the case of the surprise TFP shock - regardless of parameters, the term spread
decreases after the TFP shock. These results show that predictions in Section 1.2 are not
the consequence of the choice of model parameters. Therefore, the restrictions that rely
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on the sign of the response of the term spread can be confidently used in the empirical
part.
1.4 Does positive news lead to expansions?
The theoretical results discussed above allow me to identify news shocks in the data using
an identification strategy that does not depend on restricting the response of TFP data.
To date, news shocks have been identified by imposing zero restrictions on TFP. However,
since TFP measures are artificial constructs that are prone to large measurement errors,
these restrictions can lead to incorrect conclusions. This is particularly true in cases when
measurement errors are correlated with news shocks, as will be shown below.
The empirical analysis is done with a large-scale factor model. Factor models do not
suffer from the problem of non-invertibility, which is an inherent problem when researching
the effects of news shocks on the real economy. The non-invertibility of the moving average
process is essentially a problem of missing information, as the econometrician does not
have the same information set as agents. To solve the problem of non-invertibility, Forni
et al. [2011] propose a large-dimensional factor model. The factor model uses a large
amount of information so, intuitively, insufficient information is unlikely.
1.4.1 Factor model
The exposition of the factor model and the methodology used to extract the structural
shock closely follows Forni and Gambetti [2010]. Each time series in the data set, xit, is
assumed to be the sum of two components:
xit = χit + ξit (1.4.1)
where χit is the common component and ξit is the idiosyncratic component. The idiosyn-
cratic component can be thought of as a variable specific shock or a measurement error.
The common components are the linear combination of r static factors:
χit = a1if1t + a2if2t + . . .+ arifrt = aift (1.4.2)
where asi and fst for s = 1 . . . r are factor loadings and static factors, respectively. The
dynamic relation between macroeconomic variables implies a VAR representation for the
factors:
ft = Dift−1 + . . .+Dift−p + t (1.4.3)
t = Rut (1.4.4)
14
Chapter 1. Can the Term Spread Reveal the Effect of News Shocks?
where ut is a vector of q dynamic factors and R is an r×q matrix, with q ≤ r, implying the
number of dynamic factors is less than or equal to the number of static factors. Equations
(1.4.2), (1.4.3) and (1.4.4) can be combined as:
xit = bi(L)ut + ξit (1.4.5)
where
bi(L) = ai(I −D1L− . . .−DpLp)R (1.4.6)
The dynamic factors, ut can be interpreted as structural shocks, and bi(L) are the related
impulse responses.
1.4.2 Number of static and dynamic factors
One of the main issues in estimating dynamic factor models is choosing the number of
static and dynamic factors, r and q. There are a number of tests available in the literature,
but the selected number of static and dynamic factors usually differs considerably between
different tests.
The most popular test for the number of static factors was proposed by Bai and Ng
[2002]. The test IC(1) proposed in their paper suggests that there are 20 static factors
in my data, while the test IC(2) suggests using 18 static factors. On the other hand, the
BIC test tailored for panel data setup, BIC(3), selects only 10 static factors. Finally, the
test for the number of static factors proposed in Onatski [2009] favors 10 static factors.
Therefore, the number of static factors should be in the range r ∈ [10, 20].
Similar results apply to testing the number of dynamic factors. While the tests pro-
posed in Bai and Ng [2007], depending on the number of static factors, suggest that there
are 5 or 8 dynamic factors, the test proposed by Onatski [2009] favors 4 dynamic factors.
Thus, the number of dynamic factors should be in the range q ∈ [4, 8].
The goal of this paper is to be as agnostic as possible; the strategy I pursue is to use
all of the proposed specifications. More precisely, at each bootstrap draw, explained in
Step 4 in Section 1.4.4, the number of static and dynamic factors is randomly selected in
the range proposed by the tests. As the number of bootstrap replications is large, each
suggested model is used and the final results correspond to an ‘average’ model. Therefore,
the presented distribution of impulse response functions (IRFs) and forecast error variance
decompositions (FEVDs) in the next section also contain uncertainty about the model.
Alternatively, I could choose one model out of the 5 × 11 = 55 models and possibly
choose the one that best fits my prior beliefs. From the Bayesian perspective this corre-
sponds to prior model selection with probability assigned to only one model. The proposed
method instead assigns equal probability to each proposed model which is preferable if
one wants to be agnostic. The results, not reported here, show that the difference between
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the models characterized by different number of static and dynamic factors is not large,
and different specifications mainly affect standard errors.5
1.4.3 VAR lag length
The last issue with respect to the model concerns the number of lags used in VAR, p. The
Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggests using 4 lags, while the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) suggest using only one lag. Conditional on the results of the Monte Carlo
exercise, discussed below, which shows that a longer lag length may be preferable to a
shorter one, I decided to use four lags in the baseline model, p = 4. I perform robustness
checks with shorter and longer lag lengths.
1.4.4 Estimation
The estimation procedure consists of four steps. In the first two steps, I estimate the
dynamic factor model. The third step takes into account the identification uncertainty
and is based on methodology proposed in Rubio-Ramrez et al. [2010]. The fourth step
takes into account the estimation uncertainty. The steps are:
1. Estimate static factors: using the chosen number of static factors, r̂, discussed
above, the first r̂ static factors are estimated using principal component analysis as
f̂t = Ân
′
X∗ where X∗ is data sample and Ân is n× r matrix of factor loadings.
2. Estimate dynamic factors: a V AR(p) is estimated using the static factors, f̂t−p,
to obtain an estimate of D(L) and the residuals t, D̂(L) and ̂t respectively. Us-
ing the chosen number of dynamic factors, q̂, discussed above, the estimation of a
non-structural representation of the common components is achieved by using the
spectral decomposition of Γ̂, the sample variance-covariance matrix of ̂t. This is
done by calculating eigenvalues of Γ̂, denoted by γj for j = 1, 2, ..., q̂. The diagonal
q̂ × q̂ matrix M is then constructed by placing √γj in the decreasing order in the
(j, j)th position. The r̂ × q̂ matrix K̂ is constructed with the corresponding nor-
malized eigenvector in the columns. Defining Ŝ = K̂M̂ , the reduced form impulse
responses can be written as:
Ĉn(L) = ÂnD̂(L)
−1Ŝ (1.4.7)
3. Sign restrictions: the non-uniqueness of the representation in (1.4.6) is used to
derive the distribution of impulse response functions.
(a) First, a q × q matrix P is constructed with draws from a standard normal
distribution, N (0, 1).
5Results for each possible model can be obtained from the author on request.
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(b) The QR decomposition of P is derived, such that P = QR and QQ′ = I.
(c) The impulse response function in (1.4.7) is post-multiplied by Q. The impulse
response function is retained if it satisfies the sign restrictions, discussed below.
(d) For every accepted impulse response function, the FEVD is calculated.
(e) The steps 3a-3d are repeated 1000 times. The retained impulse response func-
tions make up the IRF distribution.
4. Estimation uncertainty: to account for estimation uncertainty, I repeat steps 1-3
1000 times, each time with a new data sample, X∗, artificially constructed from the
original data. To construct the data samples, I follow Forni and Gambetti [2010]
and adopt a standard non-overlapping block bootstrap technique. The full T × n
matrix of data, X = [xit], is partitioned into S sub-matrices Xs, s = 1 . . . S, of
dimension τ × n, where τ is the integer part of T/S.6 An integer hs between 1 and
S is drawn randomly, with replacement, S times to obtain the sequence h1, . . . hS.
A new artificial sample of dimension τS×n is then generated as X∗ = [X ′h1 . . . X ′hS].
The point estimates and confidence bands of the IRFs are the median and relevant
percentiles of the distribution of retained IRFs. The same procedure is used to construct
the mean estimates and the related confidence bands of the FEVDs.
1.4.5 Identification
Identification of surprise and news TFP shocks is achieved by sign restrictions and by
restrictions on forecast error variance decomposition.
Sign restrictions
The structural decomposition in (1.4.6) is not unique. To see this, assume H is an
orthogonal q × q matrix such that HH ′ = I. Multiplying bi(L) by H we can obtain an
alternative structural decomposition, where Rut now becomes Svt with S = RH
′ and
vt = Hut.
To obtain a unique structural decomposition, the researcher needs to impose q(q−1)/2
restrictions, which is identical to the problem of identification in a Structural Vector
Auto-Regression model (SVAR). In the present paper, rather than imposing restrictions
to obtain a unique identification, I obtain the distribution of plausible impulse response
functions by imposing sign restrictions, as in Faust [1998], Canova and Nicolo´ [2002] and
Uhlig [2005].
In the theoretical sections I showed that, regardless of the parameterization of the
model, the term spread responds positively to a positive news shock and negatively to
6In the present paper I choose a fairly high value of τ = 21, as I want to retain the relevant lagged
auto- and cross-covariances, which are especially important to explore the effect of the news shock.
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a positive surprise TFP shock. Different combinations of the model’s parameters, for
the most part, do not affect the sign of the response of consumption and stock prices -
for most of the parameter combinations consumption and stock prices respond positively
to both news and surprise TFP shocks. It is worth pointing out that positive response
of consumption is also found in typical news models, like those in Beaudry and Portier
[2007] and Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009]. In the baseline sign restriction scheme I as-
sume that both consumption and stock prices increase following both shocks. However, I
also perform robustness checks where I restrict only one of the two variables to respond
positively.
On the other hand, the response of other variables, like output and investment, cru-
cially depends on certain parameters of the model. In the empirical investigation I thus
want to leave the response of output and investment to the news shock unrestricted. The
restrictions I employ are presented in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Sign restrictions - baseline identification scheme
Stock prices Consumption Term spread
TPF surprise shock > > <
TFP news shock > > >
The sign restrictions are imposed on (log) levels of variables and for one year.7 The
fact that I use 116 time series implies that stock prices, consumption and the term spread
are captured by more than one series. Stock prices may be represented in the data by the
real stock price index, S&P500, the US Share Price Index, NADJ, and the US Dow Jones
Industrials Share Price Index. Consumption is represented by Real Personal Consumption
Expenditures, while the term spread is represented by the three measures discussed above.
The sign restrictions are applied to all of these variables.
Restrictions on Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Although the theory suggests that the sign restrictions proposed above should be able to
separate surprise and news TFP shocks, separation of these shocks from other possible
shocks may be problematic. For example, a monetary shock may well have the same
dynamics as news TFP shock for the restricted variables.
In order to separate TFP shocks from other shocks, like monetary or fiscal shocks, I
add the restriction that the two TFP shocks explain at least 80 percent of the FEV of
TFP. A similar approach to identify investment-specific news shock was used in Ben Zeev
[2014].
7Imposing sign restrictions only for one quarter does not qualitatively change the results, except
standard error bands become wider. Results can be obtained from the author on request.
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1.4.6 Monte Carlo simulation Results
Before estimating the model on the US data, I carry out an exercise to show that the
proposed methodology works on simulated data. The data was simulated for 250 periods
200 times with the DSGE model presented in the previous section. I use the baseline
parameters as shown in Table A.2. All 26 endogenous variables from the model are used
in the Factor model. The selection criteria suggested that the number of static factors is
in the range r ∈ [3, 6] and the number of dynamic factor is in the range q ∈ [2, 3]. The
identification restrictions are the same as those used in the baseline empirical model.
Figure A.5 shows the IRFs for the surprise TFP and Figure A.6 shows the IRFs for the
news shock. The model-based impulse responses are mostly included in two standard error
bands. The theoretical responses of output and investment to the news shock are negative.
While the estimated median responses of output and investment are negative, the impact
responses are not significant - a consequence of using a partial identification scheme and
a small sample. Nevertheless, the estimation methodology performs reasonably well in
the presented Monte Carlo and thus it can confidently be used in the empirical exercise.
1.4.7 Data
The US data set consists of 116 time series covering the period from the first quarter of
1959 until the fourth quarter of 2011. Most of the data is from FRED, while time series
corresponding to TFP measures is from Fernald [2009]. The real stock price index S&P is
from Shiller [2001]. All the series are described in the Appendix in Table A.1. The data
used corresponds in large part to data used in Forni and Gambetti [2010].
I use two measures for the term spread on government bonds. The first is constructed
as the difference between the yield of government bond with 5-year and 1-year maturity.
The second is defined as the difference between the yield of government bond with 10-year
maturity and the yield of 3-month treasury bill. The corporate term spread is defined as
the difference between the yied on Moody’s AAA-graded long term corporate bonds and
the interest rate on 3-month commercial paper.
The factor model requires data to be stationary. I follow Stock and Watson [2005]
and take the second log-difference of prices and nominal variables and first differences of
interest rates and spreads. The exact transformation applied to each series is described
in the Appendix in Table A.1. After the transformation all the series appear to be
stationary.8
The last issue concerns outliers. These are identified as values differing from the mean
of each series by 6-times the interquartile range.9 Identified outliers are then replaced
8Stationarity is tested using the ADF and the KPSS tests.
9The bulk of outliers were identified in the series of Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions,
Board of Governors Total Reserves and Board of Governors Monetary Base, which increase dramatically
after 2007.
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with the corresponding maximum value - in the case of a positive value, with the mean
plus 6-times the interquartile range and in the case of a negative value, with the mean
minus 6-times the interquartile range.
1.5 Empirical Results
Figures A.7 and A.8 present the impulse responses of selected variables to the identified
surprise and the news TFP shock respectively. The lower and upper bands represent one
standard deviation from the median, and contain uncertainty about identification, the
model and the parameter values.
On impact, the surprise TFP shock produces movements we expect - output, invest-
ment, interest rate, labor productivity and TFP all increase. The only prediction not
in line with the standard new-Keynesian DSGE model is the response of inflation - the
median response of inflation is positive following the positive TFP shock. The positive
response of inflation is discussed below.
Besides the sign of responses, it is also interesting to look at the shape of impulse
responses. Stock prices, output, consumption, investment, labor productivity and TFP
increase on impact, but then the effect starts to fade out. However, the TFP shock still
seems to have a permanent effect. On the other hand, the response of the measure of TFP
adjusted for utilization turns insignificant after five quarters. The ‘transitory nature’ of
surprise TFP shocks was found also in Barsky and Sims [2011].
The opposite result holds true for the effects of the news shock - the shape of the
impulse responses to the news shock in Figure A.8 suggests a permanent increase in the
variables of interests, confirming the findings in Beaudry and Portier [2006] and Barsky
and Sims [2011]. Thus, the term spread embodies important information that can help
separate unanticipated and anticipated TFP increases. A similar conclusion is also found
in Kurmann and Otrok [2013] - they show that the shock that explains most of the
fluctuations of the slope of the term structure of interest rates is closely related to the
news shock about TFP.
Output increases after the news shock, while the large standard errors make it difficult
to be explicit about the impact response of investment, although the median response of
investment is slightly positive. The interest rate decreases significantly after the news
shock. Kurmann and Otrok [2013] find the same result and attribute it to the systematic
response of monetary policy to the news shock. TFP adjusted for utilization increases
immediately after the news shock, which is not in line with theoretical model.10 The
reason may be that the measure of TFP is contaminated by measurement errors that
are positively correlated with news shocks. Below I check whether results change when
10This result is not robust - for example considering two standard-error confidence bands, the increase
is not significant.
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assuming a zero impact effect of news shock on the measure of TFP.
In subsequent periods the effect of the news shock becomes more significant: most
of the aggregate variables track predicted movements in observed technology. The small
impact and large long-run effects of the news shock are in line with the predictions of
most DSGE models. On the other hand, the effect on inflation is negative on impact,
similar to what is found in Barsky and Sims [2011].
The identified news TFP shock can be interpreted as a standard ‘supply’ shock as it
leads to a fall in inflation while output increases. On the other hand, transitory effects and
the positive responses of inflation and interest rates suggest that the identified surprise
TFP shock can be interpreted as a ‘demand’ shock rather than ‘supply’ shock. Although
the increase of the TFP measure is not in line with the ‘demand’ shock interpretation of
surprise TFP shock, a positive correlation between the measurement errors of TFP and
‘demand’ shocks can be a reason why TFP increases after the identified surprise TFP
shock.
1.5.1 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Figure A.9 presents the forecast error variance decomposition for the surprise TFP shock,
the news shock and a sum of all other shocks. The relative importance of the two shocks
varies for different variables. The contribution of each set of shocks for the FEVD of stock
prices is approximately equal and does not vary considerably across forecast horizons.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from looking at the FEVD of consumer sentiment,
while in the short run news shocks most affect the government term spread and the
corporate term spread. All these variables can be described as forward-looking. The fact
that news shocks explain a great deal of the FEV in forward-looking variables should not
be surprising.
The ‘real economy’ variables display a different pattern. Approximately half of the first
period FEV of output, consumption, investment and both TFP measures is explained by
the surprise TFP shock, while the contribution of the news shock to FEV is only around
twenty percent. However, the longer the time horizon, the higher the contribution of
the news shock to FEV. A higher contribution for longer horizons is consistent with the
predictions from most DSGE models.
1.5.2 News or monetary shocks?
The large effect of the news shocks on the forecast error variance of interest rates may
suggest that I have identified monetary shocks and not a news TFP shock. However,
there are at least two reasons that this is not the case. The ‘real economy’ variables,
together with all the measures of TFP and labor productivity, are permanently affected
by the news shock. At the same time, the decrease of interest rates in the first periods
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following the news shock is reversed afterwards. Lastly, the news shock causes inflation
to fall, which we do not expect from an expansionary monetary shock. Therefore, the
results confirm the hypothesis put forward by Kurmann and Otrok [2013], who argue that
monetary policy systematically reacts to news shocks.
1.6 Robustness check
In this section, I explore the robustness of the results to changes in the identification
assumptions and to different lag lengths for the VAR of static factors.
1.6.1 Relationship to previous literature
To explore the relationship between the results presented here and those obtained from
other models, I apply the identification strategies of two key papers in the literature to
my model and compare the results.
Beaudry and Portier [2006]
In their baseline model, Beaudry and Portier [2006] use a VECM(2) including the level
of TFP and stock prices. To separate the news shock from surprise TFP shocks they
assume that the news shock does not affect TFP on impact, but possibly only with a
lag. When they include output in the system and thus estimate a VECM(3), they have
to assume two other exclusion restrictions. They assume that the third structural shock
has no long-run effect on either TFP or consumption. Due to the identification approach
used in this paper, I can discard this extra restriction and use only those that separate
surprise and news TFP shocks.
First, I use the identification restrictions used in the paper. That is, I impose that
both TFP and stock prices increase following the surprise TFP shock, while the news
shock does not affect TFP on impact. The exact restrictions used are in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Sign restrictions - comparison with Beaudry and Portier [2006]
TFP Stock prices (corporate) Term spread Output
TFP shock > > ? (<) ?
NEWS shock 0 > ? (>) ?
Figure A.10 presents the impulse responses for the TFP shock. TFP and stock prices
increase in the first periods and afterwards decrease slightly, but the effect seems per-
manent. Output increases on impact and in the next periods settles at a higher level.
The effect of the surprise TFP shock on the term spread is insignificant, but the median
response suggests the term spread decreases on impact.
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The impulse responses for the news shock are shown in Figure A.11. When only
restrictions on stock prices and TFP are used, the effect of news shock is not identified
precisely and except for stock prices, all responses are insignificant.
As a second exercise, I also restrict the response of the term spread for the two shocks.
The term spread is assumed to decrease after the surprise TFP shock and increase after
the news shock, as shown in brackets in Table 1.2. Contrary to the results obtained when
the term spread is not restricted, the information contained in the term spread enables me
to estimate the effect of the news shock much more precisely. As can be seen from Figure
A.13, TFP starts to increase following the news shock and after about six periods settles
at a permanently higher level. The news shock has a similar effect on output, although
the median response suggests that on impact output decreases and only later starts to
increase.
To conclude, the information contained in the term spread is useful and empirical
inference about the effect of news shocks can be considerably improved relative to the
case when only the restrictions of Beaudry and Portier [2006] are employed.
Barsky and Sims [2011]
Barsky and Sims [2011] identify the news shock as the shock orthogonal to observed
technology innovations that best explains variation in future observed technology. I follow
this strategy and identify the surprise and the news TFP shock without using restrictions
on the term spread.11
I follow closely Barsky and Sims [2011] by estimating a VAR in levels with four lags
and four variables: TFP adjusted for utilization, consumption, output and the corporate
term spread (numbers 8, 3, 2 and 10 in Table A.1 in the Appendix). The only difference
is that I include the term spread, while Barsky and Sims [2011] include hours worked per
person as the last variable in their VAR.
Figures A.14 and A.15 show the impulse responses to the surprise TFP and the news
TFP shock respectively. The term spread responds as predicted by theory - it decreases
significantly after the surprise TFP shock and it increases significantly after the news
TFP shock. This result confirms the suitability of the empirical methodology used in this
paper and shows that the information contained in the term spread is useful for separating
surprise TFP shocks from news TFP shocks.
1.6.2 ‘Zero’ restrictions
To facilitate the comparison of my results with those obtained in other papers, I add the
zero impact restriction of the news shock on TFP. This is a standard identification restric-
tion used in the ‘news’ literature. Exclusion restrictions are sometimes ad hoc, but in the
11I would like to thank Nadav Ben Zeev for providing me with codes used in this subsection.
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case of identifying the news shock this restriction is theoretically sound. Nevertheless, one
should believe that the estimated TFP measure is a good approximation to theoretical
counterpart to be confident in such an identification restriction.
The results are presented in Figures A.16 and A.17. The large number of identification
restrictions results in a big shrinkage of standard errors. The response to the surprise TFP
shock follows theoretical predictions. Output, consumption, investment, interest rates and
stock prices all increase and stay permanently higher following the TFP shock. The only
qualitative difference between the case when zero restriction is not used is that inflation
now decreases, although the effect is not significant.
More interesting are the responses to the news shock. Contrary to the previous results,
the impact response of output now becomes insignificant. In addition, the zero restriction
allows me to pin down the impact effect on investment; the news shock seems to be
associated with a decrease of investment on impact.
The result that investment decreases on impact following the news shock is in line with
the findings in Barsky and Sims [2011] and Forni et al. [2011], but contrary to what is in
Beaudry and Portier [2006]. However, the result crucially depends on the quality of the
TFP measure. For example, in case of a positive correlation between measurement errors
in TFP and the news shock, the assumption of a zero impact effect on TFP is incorrect.
Using such a restriction results in the wrong conclusions about the impact effect; the
true impact effect on output may be positive, but the estimated effect would suggest a
negative response, which was also confirmed by Monte Carlo exercises not shown here.
Constraining the response of TFP by zero restriction implies reduced response of other
variables interrelated with TFP, like output and investment.
1.6.3 Only sign restrictions
As with the zero restrictions, the restrictions on the FEV of TFP assumes that the measure
of TFP is precisely estimated. While those restrictions helped in identifying the shocks,
the methodology used in this paper allows to completely dispense with any restrictions
on TFP.
Figures A.18 and A.19 show the impulse responses to the surprise and the news TFP
shock when only sign restrictions from Table 1.1 are used, and the FEV is left unrestricted.
Except for wider error bands, the results are not considerably different from the baseline
restrictions.
Figure A.20 shows that the FEVD is more affected by the change in identification
assumptions. On the one hand, the relative importance of surprise versus news TFP
shocks does not change considerably. On the other hand, the absolute shares of FEVD
explained by both TFP shocks decreases substantially. While in the baseline model the
two TFP shocks explain around 80 percent of the variation in output, consumption and
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investment, this share falls to around 60 percent when only sign restrictions are used.
The decrease of the absolute share of FEV explained by both TFP shocks is the
expected result when restrictions on FEVD are not used. However, given that now only
40 percent of the FEV of TFP is explained by both TFP shocks, adding the baseline
restriction that 80 percent of the FEV of TFP should be explained by the TFP shocks
seems an appropriate restriction.
1.6.4 Alternative sign restrictions
As we saw, different combinations of the model’s parameters can affect the sign of the
response of consumption and stock prices. In contrast to restrictions on the term spread,
one may still argue that constraints on consumption and stock prices are too restrictive.
In this section I thus relax restrictions on the response of consumption and stock prices
and show that this does not considerably change the results.
Figures A.21 and A.22 present the case when the response of consumption is not
restricted. The shape of the responses are similar to the baseline model, while the standard
error bands are wider. The response of consumption is positive on impact, which suggests
that the restriction used in the baseline results is not too far from the truth.
Figures A.23 and A.24 present the case when the response of stock prices is not
restricted. Again, the shape of the responses is similar to the baseline model, while the
standard error bands are wider. The impact effect of stock prices to the news shock is
significant and in line with the restriction used in the baseline model.
Despite the similarities, one can notice a difference in these two cases. When only
sign restrictions on the response of stock prices are used, the news shock seems to be
anticipated with a longer time lag than in the case when only the response of consumption
is restricted. In fact, the impact responses of most variables, such as output, TFP and
investment, to the news shock are smaller when sign restrictions are only used on stock
prices. Stock prices appear more forward-looking than consumption, thus capturing the
arrival of news sooner than consumption. If one of the two restrictions has to be chosen,
restricting stock prices seems preferable.
1.6.5 Lag length
Figures A.25 and A.26 show the results when eight lags are used to estimate the VAR for
the static factors. Compared to the baseline model with 4 lags, the median responses do
not change dramatically. The main differences are wider standard errors bands, which is
not surprising given that up to 126 parameters are estimated.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from looking at Figures A.27 and A.28, which show
responses for the VAR with one lag. While the responses of other variables to both shocks
are similar to the baseline model, the response of TFP adjusted for utilization to the news
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shock differs considerably. First of all, the response is insignificant, but also the median
response differs in shape; there is no evidence that after the news shock TFP adjusted for
utilization increases. The reason may be that a short lag length cannot capture well the
effect of the news shock.
1.7 Conclusions
In the theoretical section, I have shown that the term spread responds differently to the
surprise TFP and the news shock. On the one hand, the news that technology will improve
in the future increases the term spread. On the other hand, the term spread decreases
after the standard surprise TFP shock.
I use this robust response of the term spread to identify the effects of news and TFP
shocks in US data. I find that standard surprise TFP shocks are the most important
driver of business cycles, while news shocks account for about 30 percent of business cycle
fluctuations in the US. However, cycles of some variables, like stock prices and the term
spread, can to a large extent be attributed to news shocks.
The instantaneous effect of news shocks on output and investment is quantitatively
small and the sign of this effect depends on the identification restrictions. Which restric-
tion to use depends on how much one believes in the quality of the TFP data. Contrary
to this, the effect of the news shock at medium-term horizons is clear. Aggregate variables
mainly follow TFP movements: consumption, output and investment increase following
the news shock.
For future work it would be interesting to find other financial variables that responds
differently to unanticipated and anticipated shocks, regardless of the parameters of the
model. Such a variable could then be used to strengthen the identification of the news
shock. The methodology used in this paper could also be applied to identify other struc-
tural shocks that are characterized by anticipation effects, for example government spend-
ing shocks. Lastly, it would be interesting to check whether the information about expec-
tations contained in the term spread could improve the forecasting capabilities of DSGE
models.
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Appendix: Can the Term Spread
Reveal the Effect of News Shocks?
A.1 Appendix - Data
Table A.1: The list of data series and their transformations used in the paper
no. Tra. Mnemonic Long Label
1 5 REALS&P Real stock price index S&P500 (Robert Shiller)
2 5 GDPC1 Real Gross Domestic Product, 1 Decimal
3 5 PCECC96 Real Personal Consumption Expenditures
4 5 GPDI/DEF Real Gross Private Domestic Investment (GPDI)
5 2 FEDFUNDS Effective Federal Funds Rate
6 2 UMCSENT University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment (UMCSENT)
7 5 DTFP Business sector TFP (produced by John Fernald)
8 5 DTFPUTIL Utilization-adjusted TFP (produced by John Fernald)
9 2 GS10-FEDFUNDS Government term spread
10 2 CPN3M-CPN3M Corporate term spread
11 5 GNPC96 Real Gross National Product
12 5 NICUR/GDPDEF National Income/GDPDEF
13 5 DPIC96 Real Disposable Personal Income
14 5 OUTNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output
15 5 FINSLC1 Real Final Sales of Domestic Product, 1 Decimal
16 5 PRFI/DEF Real Private Residential Fixed Investment (PRFI)
17 5 PNFI/DEF Real Private Nonresidential Fixed Investment (PNFI)
18 5 GPDIC1 Real Gross Private Domestic Investment, 1 Decimal
19 5 PCND/DEF Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods
20 5 PCDG/DEF Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods
21 5 PCES/DEF Real Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services
22 5 GPSAVE/GDPDEF Gross Private Saving/GDP Deflator
23 5 FGCE/DEF Real Federal Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment (FGCE)
24 5 FGEXPND/GDPDEF Federal Government: Current Expenditures/ GDP deflator
25 5 FGRECPT/GDPDEF Federal Government Current Receipts/ GDP deflator
26 2 FGDEF Federal Real Expend-Real Receipts
27 1 CBIC1 Real Change in Private Inventories, 1 Decimal
28 5 EXPGSC1 Real Exports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal
29 5 IMPGSC1 Real Imports of Goods & Services, 1 Decimal
30 5 CP/GDPDEF Corporate Profits After Tax/GDP deflator
31 5 NFCPATAX/GDPDEF Nonfinancial Corporate Business: Profits After Tax/GDP deflator
32 5 CNCF/GDPDEF Corporate Net Cash Flow/GDP deflator
33 5 DIVIDEND/GDPDEF Net Corporate Dividends/GDP deflator
34 5 HOANBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons
35 5 OPHNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Output Per Hour of All Persons
36 5 UNLPNBS Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Nonlabor Payments
37 5 ULCNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Unit Labor Cost
38 5 WASCUR/CPI Compensation of Employees: Wages & Salary Accruals/CPI
* 1=no transformation 2=first differences 5=first differences of logs 6= second differences of logs *
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Table A.1: The list of data series and their transformations used in the paper
no. Tra. Mnemonic Long Label
39 6 COMPNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation Per Hour
40 5 COMPRNFB Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
41 6 GDPCTPI Gross Domestic Product: Chain-type Price Index
42 6 GNPCTPI Gross National Product: Chain-type Price Index
43 6 GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deflator
44 6 GNPDEF Gross National Product: Implicit Price Deflator
45 5 INDPRO Industrial Production Index
46 5 IPBUSEQ Industrial Production: Business Equipment
47 5 IPCONGD Industrial Production: Consumer Goods
48 5 IPDCONGD Industrial Production: Durable Consumer Goods
49 5 IPFINAL Industrial Production: Final Products (Market Group)
50 5 IPMAT Industrial Production: Materials
51 5 IPNCONGD Industrial Production: Nondurable Consumer Goods
52 2 AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours: Manufacturing
53 2 AWOTMAN Average Weekly Hours: Overtime: Manufacturing
54 2 CIVPART Civilian Participation Rate
55 5 CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force
56 5 CE16OV Civilian Employment
57 5 USPRIV All Employees: Total Private Industries
58 5 USGOOD All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries
59 5 SRVPRD All Employees: Service-Providing Industries
60 5 UNEMPLOY Unemployed
61 5 UEMPMEAN Average (Mean) Duration of Unemployment
62 2 UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
63 5 HOUST Housing Starts: Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started
64 2 TB3MS 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate
65 2 GS1 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
66 2 GS10 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
67 2 AAA Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield
68 2 BAA Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield
69 2 MPRIME Bank Prime Loan Rate
70 6 BOGNONBR Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository Institutions
71 6 TRARR Board of Governors Total Reserves, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
72 6 BOGAMBSL Board of Governors Monetary Base, Adjusted for Changes in Reserve
73 6 M1SL M1 Money Stock
74 6 M2MSL M2 Minus
75 6 M2SL M2 Money Stock
76 6 BUSLOANS Commercial and Industrial Loans at All Commercial Banks
77 6 CONSUMER Consumer (Individual) Loans at All Commercial Banks
78 6 LOANINV Total Loans and Investments at All Commercial Banks
79 6 REALLN Real Estate Loans at All Commercial Banks
80 6 TOTALSL Total Consumer Credit Outstanding
81 6 CPIAUCSL Cons. Price Index : All Items
82 6 CPIULFSL Cons. Price Index : All Items Less Food
83 6 CPILEGSL Cons. Price Index : All Items Less Energy
84 6 CPILFESL Cons. Price Index : All Items Less Food & Energy
85 6 CPIENGSL Cons. Price Index: Energy
86 6 CPIUFDSL Cons. Price Index : Food
87 6 PPICPE Producer Price Index Finished Goods: Capital Equipment
88 6 PPICRM Producer Price Index: Crude Materials for Further Processing
89 6 PPIFCG Producer Price Index: Finished Consumer Goods
90 6 PPIFGS Producer Price Index: Finished Goods
91 6 OILPRICE Spot Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate
92 5 USSHRPRCF US Dow Jones Industrials Share Price Index (EP) NADJ
93 5 US500STK US Standard & Poor Index if 500 Common Stocks
94 5 USI62...F US Share Price Index NADJ
95 5 USNOIDN.D US Manufacturers New Orders for Non Defense Capital Goods (BCI 27)
96 5 USCNORCGD US New Orders of Consumer Goods & Materials (BCI 8) CONA
97 1 USNAPMNO US ISM Manufacturers Survey: New Orders Index SADJ
98 5 USCYLEAD US The Conference Board Leading Economic Indicators Index SADJ
99 5 USECRIWLH US Economic Cycle Research Institute Weekly Leading Index
100 2 GS1-FEDFUNDS Spread between 1-year treasury and FEDFUNDS
101 2 BAA-FEDFUNDS Spread between BAA rared corporate bond and FEDFUNDS
102 5 GEXPND/GDPDEF Government Current Expenditures/ GDP deflator
103 5 GRECPT/GDPDEF Government Current Receipts/ GDP deflator
104 2 GDEF Governnent Real Expend-Real Receipts
105 5 GCEC1 Real Government Consumption Expenditures & Gross Investment
106 5 PE Adjusted Price-Earnings ratio (Robert Shiller)
* 1=no transformation 2=first differences 5=first differences of logs 6= second differences of logs *
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Table A.1: The list of data series and their transformations used in the paper
no. Tra. Mnemonic Long Label
107 2 GS5-GS1 5-Year - 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
108 5 IST Equipment-investment share of business output (produced by John Fernald)
109 2 UTIL Utilization (produced by John Fernald)
110 5 dLP Business- sector labor productivity (produced by John Fernald)
111 5 TFP INV TFP in equip and con. durables (produced by John Fernald)
112 5 TFP CON TFP in non equip and con. durables (produced by John Fernald)
113 5 TFP INV U Util. adj. TFP in equip and con. durables (produced by John Fernald)
114 5 TFP CON U Util. adj. TFP in non equip and con. durables (produced by John Fernald)
115 2 UTIL INV Utilization in equip and con. durables (produced by John Fernald)
116 2 UTIL CON Utilization in non equip and con. durables (produced by John Fernald)
* 1=no transformation 2=first differences 5=first differences of logs 6= second differences of logs *
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A.2 Appendix - Proofs of propositions from Section
1.2
Proposition 1. The term spread equals zero when the expected growth rate of marginal utility is constant,
independent of the growth rate.
Proof. Let us start with the definition of a constant growth rate:
u′(ct)− u′(ct−1)
u′(ct−1)
= r ∀t (A.2.1)
for some constant r. Defining ρ = (1 + r), I can write marginal utility at time t as:
u′(ct) = u′(c0)ρt (A.2.2)
Using this equation we can now forecast the values in equation 1.2.7:
Etu
′(ct+k) = u′(c0)ρt+k
Etu
′(ct+j) = u′(c0)ρt+j
(A.2.3)
Equation (1.2.7) can now be solved:
T˜ St ≡ R˜k,t
R˜j,t
=
((
u′(c0)ρt
)
[(u′(c0)ρt+k)]−1
)1/k((
u′(c0)ρt
)
[(u′(c0)ρt+j)]−1
)1/j
=
(ρ−k)1/k
(ρ−j)1/j
= 1 ∀ ρ ∈ R
(A.2.4)
which says that regardless of the expected growth rate of marginal utility, r, term spread is zero when
growth rate is constant.
Proposition 2.
i.) The term spread is positive when the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption is
decreasing in time and the term spread is negative when the expected growth rate of the marginal
utility of consumption is increasing with time.
ii.) The term spread is positive when the expected decay of the marginal utility of consumption is in-
creasing in time and the term spread is negative when the expected decay of the marginal utility of
consumption is decreasing with time.
Proof. The changing rate of growth rate can be defined as:
u′(ct)− u′(ct−1)
u′(ct−1)
= rφ(t) (A.2.5)
where φ(t) is some function of time. Marginal utility at time t+ k and t+ j can be solved as:
Etu
′(ct+k) = u′(c0)[1 + rφ(t+ k)]t+k (A.2.6)
Etu
′(ct+j) = u′(c0)[1 + rφ(t+ j)]t+j (A.2.7)
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The expected values in equation 1.2.7 can now be solved:
T˜ St ≡ R˜k,t
R˜j,t
=
(
(u′(c0)[1 + rφ(t)]t)[u′(c0)[1 + rφ(t+ k)]t+k]−1
)1/k(
(u′(c0)[1 + rφ(t)]t)[u′(c0)[1 + rφ(t+ j)]t+j ]−1
)1/j
=
(
([1 + rφ(t)]t)[([1 + rφ(t+ k)]t+k)]−1
)1/k(
([1 + rφ(t)]t)[([1 + rφ(t+ j)]t+j)]−1
)1/j
(A.2.8)
in order for the term spread to be positive, we need:
(
[1 + rφ(t)]t
[1 + rφ(t+ k)]t+k
)1/k
>
(
[1 + rφ(t)]t
[1 + rφ(t+ j)]t+j
)1/j
(A.2.9)
I assume without the loss of generality that period t = 0, so condition in (A.2.9) boils down to:
[1 + rφ(k)] < [1 + rφ(j)] (A.2.10)
Starting with the first part of proposition 2 which states that for a positive growth rate, r > 0
and φ(t) > 0 ∀ t, the term spread is positive when the expected growth rate the marginal utility of
consumption is decreasing in time. The decreasing growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption
corresponds to the case when the derivative of generic function with respect to time is negative, ∂φ(t)∂t < 0.
Using the assumption that k > j, this implies φ(k) < φ(j). This is exactly the condition we need to
satisfy the condition (A.2.10) and confirms that for a positive growth rate, r > 0 and φ(t) > 0 ∀ t, the
term spread is positive when the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing
in time. The mirror argument can be used to show that for a positive growth rate, the term spread is
negative when the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in time.
The second part of proposition 2 states that when the growth rate is negative, r < 0 and φ(t) > 0 ∀ t,
the term spread is positive when the expected decay of the marginal utility of consumption is increasing
in time. The condition (A.2.10) is now:
[1− rφ(k)] < [1− rφ(j)] (A.2.11)
The increasing decay of the marginal utility of consumption corresponds to the case when the derivative
of generic function with respect to time is positive, ∂φ(t)∂t > 0. Using the assumption that k > j, this
implies φ(k) > φ(j). This is exactly the condition we need to satisfy the condition (A.2.11) and confirms
that for a negative growth rate, r < 0 and φ(t) > 0 ∀ t, the term spread is positive when the expected
decay of the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in time. The mirror argument can be used
to show that for a negative growth rate, the term spread is negative when the expected decay of the
marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in time.
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A.3.1 Baseline parameters
Table A.2: Baseline Parameter’s values
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
β 0.95 ω 1 gb 0.3yss
α 0.36 φn 0 gg 0.2yss
δ 0.1 γb 0 p 5
γ 1 γg 0 q 5
θ 1.5 ρ 0.9 l 5
ψ 0.8 σ 0.05
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A.3.2 Baseline IRF
Figure A.1: IRF to the TFP shock - baseline parameters
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The figure presents the impulse responses to the TFP shock of TFP, stock prices, term spread, output, consumption and
investment for the model presented in Section 1.3 with baseline parameters.
Figure A.2: IRF to the news shock - baseline parameters
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The figure presents the impulse responses to the news shock of TFP, stock prices, term spread, output, consumption and
investment for the model presented in Section 1.3 with baseline parameters. The news shock is assumed to anticipate the
TFP shock 4 periods ahead.
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A.3.3 IRF with different combinations of parameters
Figure A.3: IRF to the TFP shock - different combinations of parameters
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The figure presents the impulse responses to the TFP shock of TFP, stock prices, term spread, output, consumption and
investment for different combinations of parameters presented in Section 1.3.5.
Figure A.4: IRF to the news shock - different combinations of parameters
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The figure presents the impulse responses to the news shock of TFP, stock prices, term spread, output, consumption and
investment for different combinations of parameters presented in Section 1.3.5.The news shock is assumed to anticipate the
TFP shock 4 periods ahead.
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A.4 Appendix -Monte Carlo simulation
Figure A.5: Impulse responses to tfp shock
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The figure presents the impulse responses to surprise TFP shock of TFP, stock prices, term spread, output, consumption
and investment. The data was simulated with the model presented in Section 1.3 for 250 periods. The news shock is
assumed to anticipate TFP shock 4 periods ahead. The sign restrictions are the same as used in baseline factor model. The
dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of two-standard deviation. The lines with the
circles corresponds to true impulse responses.
Figure A.6: Impulse responses to news shock
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news TFP shock of TFP, stock prices, term spread, output, consumption and
investment. The data was simulated with the model presented in Section 1.3 for 250 periods. The news shock is assumed
to anticipate TFP shock 4 periods ahead. The sign restrictions are the same as used in baseline factor model. The dashed
lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of two-standard deviation. The lines with the circles
corresponds to true impulse responses.
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A.5 Appendix - Factor model
Figure A.7: Impulse responses to TFP shock for selected variables - baseline
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.8: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - baseline
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.9: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - baseline
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The figure presents Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the TFP shock, the news shock and other shocks of (log)
S&P real stock prices, (log) output and (log) consumption in the first row, (log) investment,interest rate and consumer
sentiment in the second row, (log) TFP, (log) TFP adjusted for utilization and government term spread in the third raw,
corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In order, the number in the table A.1 of
presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
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A.6 Appendix - Comparison with Beaudry and Portier
[2006]
Figure A.10: IRF to TFP shock for selected variables - comparison with Beaudry and Portier
[2006]
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) TFP, (log) S&P real stock prices, corporate term spread
and (log) output. In order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 8,1,10, 2. The dashed lines correspond to
identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.11: IRF to news shock for selected variables - comparison with Beaudry and Portier
[2006]
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) TFP, (log) S&P real stock prices, corporate term spread
and (log) output. In order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 8,1,10, 2. The dashed lines correspond to
identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.12: Impulse responses to TFP shock for selected variables - comparison with Beaudry
and Portier [2006]
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) TFP, (log) S&P real stock prices, corporate term spread
and (log) output. In order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 8,1,10, 2. The dashed lines correspond to
identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.13: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - comparison with Beaudry
and Portier [2006]
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) TFP, (log) S&P real stock prices, corporate term spread
and (log) output. In order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 8,1,10, 2. The dashed lines correspond to
identification and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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A.7 Appendix - Comparison with Barsky and Sims
[2011]
Figure A.14: Impulse responses to surprise TFP shock for selected variables - comparison with
Barsky and Sims [2011]
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The figure presents the impulse responses to surprise TFP shock of (log) TFP, (log) consumption, (log) output and corporate
term spread. In order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 8,3,2, 10. The solid lines correspond to point
estimates. The dashed lines correspond to parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.15: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - comparison with Barsky
and Sims [2011]
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news TFP shock of (log) TFP, (log) consumption, (log) output and corporate
term spread. In order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 8,3,2, 10. The solid lines correspond to point
estimates. The dashed lines correspond to parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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A.8 Appendix - Robustness check
Figure A.16: Impulse responses to the surprise TFP shock for selected variables - zero restrictions
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.17: Impulse responses to the news shock for selected variables - zero restrictions
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.18: Impulse responses to the surprise TFP shock for selected variables - only sign
restrictions
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.19: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - only sign restrictions
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.20: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition - only sign restrictions
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The figure presents Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the TFP shock, the news shock and other shocks of (log)
S&P real stock prices, (log) output and (log) consumption in the first row, (log) investment,interest rate and consumer
sentiment in the second row, (log) TFP, (log) TFP adjusted for utilization and government term spread in the third raw,
corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In order, the number in the table A.1 of
presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
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Figure A.21: Impulse responses to TFP shock for selected variables - restrictions only on SP
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.22: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - restrictions only on SP
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.23: Impulse responses to TFP shock for selected variables - restrictions only on Con-
sumption
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.24: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - restrictions only on Con-
sumption
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.25: Impulse responses to TFP shock for selected variables - baseline with 8 lags
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.26: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - baseline with 8 lags
5 10 15 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
 
 
S&P
5 10 15 20
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
 
 
Y
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
x 10−3
 
 
C
5 10 15 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
 
 
I
5 10 15 20
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
 
 
IR
5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
 
 
SENT
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
x 10−3
 
 
TFP
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
x 10−3
 
 
TFP
u
5 10 15 20
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
 
 
GS
5 10 15 20
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
 
 
CS
5 10 15 20
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
x 10−3
 
 
INF
5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
x 10−3
 
 
L.PRO
The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Figure A.27: Impulse responses to TFP shock for selected variables - baseline with 1 lag
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The figure presents the impulse responses to TFP shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
Figure A.28: Impulse responses to news shock for selected variables - baseline with 1 lag
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The figure presents the impulse responses to news shock of (log) S&P real stock prices, (log) output, (log) consumption and
(log) investment in the first row, interest rate, consumer confidence, (log) TFP and (log) TFP adjusted for utilization in
the second raw, government term spread, corporate term spread, inflation and (log) labor productivity in the last raw. In
order, the number in the table A.1 of presented variables is: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, 81 and 110. The variables are standardized.
The dashed lines correspond to identification,model and parameter uncertainty of one-standard deviation.
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Chapter 2
Animal Spirits, Fundamental Factors
and Business Cycle Fluctuations
joint with Stephane De´es
2.1 Introduction
The 2008/09 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed has led many observers
and academics to interpret the recession as a sharp decline in aggregate demand resulting
from a collapse in confidence. This gave rise to a self-fulfilling shock to expectations.1
This suggests that the way that households and firms form expectations of the future may
therefore be an independent driving force of the business cycle.
The idea that agents’ beliefs may be a source of economic fluctuations has a long
history. Pigou [1929] was among the first to stress that expectations were key in explain-
ing business cycles, as psychological factors (i.e. undue optimism and pessimism) lead
entrepreneurs to make errors when forming their expectations about future profits. These
errors generate cycles through rises and falls in investment. These psychological factors
are also very often called “animal spirits”, following Keynes [1936]. Although the Real
Business Cycle theory does not incorporate such psychological factors in its explanation
of economic fluctuations, Pigou’s ideas have recently been reintroduced into the theory of
cycles in the context of equilibrium business cycle models, notably by Beaudry and Portier
[2006] or Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009]. In these models, although technology remains the
only determinant of output in the long run, news about future fundamentals can imply
a change in expectations, which affects agents’ behaviors in the short run in anticipation
of the fundamental change. However, economic agents receive only noisy signals about
future technology, leading to expectational errors (Lorenzoni [2009]). If the information
subsequently appears to have been wrong, i.e. it was just noise, the agents readjust their
1See e.g. ECB [2013],Farmer [2012] and Bacchetta et al. [2012]
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expectations and decisions accordingly. Conversely, if the information proves correct,
the economy adjusts gradually to the level of activity consistent with technology. These
changes in expectations generate economic fluctuations, both in the short and the long
term.
Blanchard et al. [2013] explore the role of noisy information in cyclical developments
empirically, separating fluctuations that are due to genuine changes in fundamentals (news
shocks) from those due to temporary expectational errors (noise shocks). They show that
identification of the shock is only possible via the estimation of a full structural model,
such as the one in Barsky and Sims [2012]. Since economic agents face a signal extraction
problem when separating news from noise shocks, the econometrician, using the same
data, cannot use structural VARs to recover such shocks. However, although this point
is valid in real time, the econometrician can potentially have access to a richer dataset in
hindsight.
Based on this idea, this paper shows that a structural VAR model can be used to
identify news and noise shocks. First, while economic agents can observe only current
and past data, the econometrician can also observe “future” data. In other words, by
using the data from the whole sample, the econometrician can have a better estimate of
the technological trends than the economic agents. Second, economic agents only observe
real-time data, while the econometrician also has access to revised data.
Recent papers have also proposed alternative ways to solve the issue put forward by
Blanchard et al. [2013]. Forni et al. [2013] use a modification of the structural VAR method
to disentangle real from noise shocks, using future data and future residuals. However,
their methodology is only applicable in economies in which the true state of the economy
can eventually be exactly retried. In this paper we show that our methodology can be
used to approximately identify news and noise shocks in more general models, such as
that of Blanchard et al. [2013], in which the true state of economy can never be retrieved.
Enders et al. [2013] identify noise shocks in a standard VAR model by including ‘nowcast
errors’, defined as the difference between actual output growth and growth estimated
contemporaneously by professional forecasters. Here we also use nowcast errors of output
growth to improve the estimates of potential output, but, unlike those authors, we also
use the fact that econometricians have access to the later realizations of the time series.
We start our analysis by designing a slightly modified version of the model by Blan-
chard et al. [2013] and show how a structural VAR can be used to disentangle news and
noise shocks. The methodology relies on the forecast errors consumers make when pre-
dicting the trend of GDP. These forecast errors are estimated by exploiting the fact that
econometricians have access to ‘future’ and revised data. Applying this method to US
data, we find that identified permanent and noise shocks have effects as predicted by
the theory. A permanent (technology) shock has an expansionary effect on the economy,
which builds through time until variables settle at a new, higher value. A noise shock also
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has an expansionary effect on the economy, but the impact fades away over time until all
variables settle at their initial value. Nevertheless, noise shocks are more important for
business cycle fluctuations, as almost half of output variations at business cycle frequen-
cies can be explained by noise shocks. On the other hand, permanent shocks drive the
economy in the long run, but only account for around 20 percent of output variations at
business cycle frequencies.
After a presentation of the theoretical model in Section 2.2, in Section 2.3 we explain
the problems related to identifying noise shocks in the data with SVAR models. We then
show that, by using future observations and revisions of data, we can circumvent those
problems and still use SVAR models to extract technology and noise shocks. In Section
2.4, we present empirical evidence on the effects of news and noise shocks, by applying
our methodology to US data. We conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Model
This section presents a simple model, similar to the model proposed by Blanchard et al.
[2013], in which consumers decide their level of consumption based on their expectations
about the economy’s long-run fundamentals. Long-run economic fundamentals are driven
by productivity developments (i.e. technology), which depend on a structural shock with
permanent effects and which build up gradually. Consumers do not observe the structural
shock but only a noisy signal. This additional source of fluctuations is called a noise shock
(or an “animal spirits” shock). As in Blanchard et al. [2013], consumers solve a signal
extraction problem and decide their level of consumption on the basis of their expectations
about future technology.
2.2.1 The structure of the model
We assume first that consumption is determined by the following Euler equation:
ct = Et[ct+1|It] (2.2.1)
where ct is consumption and Et[ct+1|It] is expected consumption in period t+ 1 based on
the information set at time t, denoted It. The supply side of the economy is completely
determined by the demand side, which implies that output, yt, equals consumption:
yt = ct (2.2.2)
Output depends on utilization, ut and the level of technology, at, in a linear fashion,
yt = at + ut. Given the level of technology and consumption, utilization adjusts to
produce the demanded level of output. However, in the long-run, output is equal to its
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natural level, and utilization is equal to zero, implying:
lim
t→∞
Et[ct+j − at+j] = 0 (2.2.3)
As is shown in Blanchard et al. [2013], equation (2.2.3) can be derived from a standard
New-Keynesian model with Calvo pricing, when the frequency of price adjustment goes
to zero. Combining (2.2.1) and (2.2.3) gives:
ct = lim
t→∞
Et[at+j|It] (2.2.4)
which implies that consumption depends on expectations about long-run productivity.
The relevant state of the economy is productivity, at, which follows the process:
at = (1 + ρ)at−1 − ρat−2 + t (2.2.5)
where t ∼ N (0, σ2 ) is a technology shock. Given that productivity is modeled as a
process with a stochastic trend, the technology shock t will have a permanent effect on
productivity.
2.2.2 Information structure
The crucial difference with a standard DSGE model lies in the information structure.
Consumers do not observe productivity directly, but observe only a noisy signal of pro-
ductivity, st:
st = at + υt (2.2.6)
where υt ∼ N (0, σ2υ) is a noise shock. The signal extraction problem can be rewritten as
a state-space model:
• State Equation [
at|t
at−1|t
]
= A
[
at−1|t−1
at−2|t−1
]
+B
[
t
υt
]
(2.2.7)
• Observation Equation
st = C
[
at|t
at−1|t
]
+D
[
t
υt
]
(2.2.8)
where at|t = Et[at|It] and the matrices A, B, C and D depend on parameters. We assume
that consumers know the underlying parameters of the economy and the distributions of
shocks, in other words they know the matrices A, B, C and D, and thus they can use a
Kalman filter to form expectations about the current state of technology.2
2Note that we are assuming that consumers do not observe utilization, otherwise agents could differ-
entiate between technology shock and noise shock by observing utilization. Utilization is anyway difficult
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Figure B.1 shows, for simulated data, the developments in productivity, i.e. potential
output growth, displayed by the smoothed line in the upper panel. Consumers receive a
noisy signal, which is by definition very volatile and form their expectations by solving the
signal extraction problem. Consumers’ expectations about technology are not accurate
as they are affected by the noise shock. The lower panel shows the forecast errors made
by consumers when predicting the state of the economy.
2.2.3 Model solution
Once we obtain the agent’s expectations about the state of technology, by standard
Kalman filtering, the solution of the model is straightforward. From Equation (2.2.4)
and (2.2.5) we can derive the solution of consumption in terms of the agent’s expecta-
tions about the state of technology:
ct =
1
1− ρ
(
at|t − ρat−1|t
)
(2.2.9)
where we have used the same notation as in the setup of the Kalman filter, at|t = Et[at|It]
and at−1|t = Et[at−1|It]. The other variables are a linear function of technology:
yt = ct (2.2.10)
ut = at − yt (2.2.11)
Figure B.2 shows the response of the model’s variables to the technology shock, t.
The standard deviation of the shock is 0.7 percent.From equation (2.2.6), in the absence of
noise shocks, the signal, st, is equal to at. Consumers underpredict the actual technological
improvement in the short term, leading to a negative forecast error. Over time, as the
signal confirms the increase in productivity, the expectations converge gradually to the
new state of the economy and the forecast error fades away. Consumption improves faster
in anticipation of the long-term effects of the technology shock.
Figure B.3 shows the responses to a noise shock. The noise shock is characterized by a
one-off change in the signal and no change in productivity. In the short term, consumers
believe that the positive signal could potentially be related to a change in technology and
their expectations about the state of the economy are positive. Over time, they realise
that the signal was just noise and the expectations gradually adjust to the initial state. As
a result, the consumers’ forecast error is positive in the short term and returns gradually to
zero over time. This short term optimism also leads consumption to be positively affected
to observe at the macroeconomic level, even though proxies for utilization of labour can be found (e.g.
hours worked). Moreover, we could also remove this assumption by introducing a transitory technological
shock, as in Blanchard et al. [2013]. By ignoring this extension, we aimed at keeping the presentation of
the signal-extraction problem as simple as possible.
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by the noise shock, as the shock has been unduly interpreted as a technology shock. Over
time, when the information becomes more accurate, they realize their forecast error and
readjust their consumption expenditures.
It is worth noting that, as in Lorenzoni [2009], the only source of exogenous uncertainty
is the productivity process at and noise shocks have the features of aggregate demand
shocks. As with productivity shocks, noise shocks are unobservable because they are
related to a noisy signal of productivity. As a result, only these two shocks can lead to
forecast errors in the same period about the current state of technology. In a more complex
model, we could therefore assume that all other sources of disturbances are observable and
do not lead to such forecast errors. Moreover, the general idea developed here can easily
be carried over in more complex models with capital accumulation, nominal rigidities or
habit persistence. For instance, Blanchard et al. [2013] show that such results are robust
when they embed the same productivity process and information structure in a small-
scale DSGE model, including investment and capital accumulation, nominal rigidities
and a monetary policy rule.
2.3 From the model to a structural VAR
In this section, we focus on the way to identify and estimate the technology and noise
shocks. Since consumers only receive a noisy signal about the shocks, it is not possi-
ble to recover technology and noise shocks from actual data on ct and st. First, we
show that a VAR representation of the model faces an issue of non-invertibility and non-
fundamentalness. Second, as the issue is mainly related to the fact that the information
set used by consumers is not accurate enough to recover the shocks, we show that having
a superior information set can help solve the problem. Third, we show how a structural
VAR approach can be used in this context.
2.3.1 Singularity of VAR models
Let us consider running a VAR with consumption, ct, and the signal, st, to obtain the
structural shocks. From Equation (2.2.9) we know that consumption is a linear function
of expectations about the current and past states of the economy:
ct = f (Et[at|It]) (2.3.1)
As the expectations about the current and past states are formed by a Kalman filtering
approach, which is a linear filter, we also know that these expectations are a linear function
of current and past signals:
Et[at|It] = g(st, st−1, ...) (2.3.2)
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Equations (2.3.1) and (2.3.2) imply that consumption is a linear function of current
and past signals:
ct = f(g(st, st−1, ...)) (2.3.3)
Combining Equations (2.2.5) and (2.2.6), we can rewrite the signal process as st =
(1 + ρ)at−1 − ρat−2 + t + υt. We can notice that both shocks - technology and noise
shocks - affect the signal. Moreover, both shocks affect the signal in the same way, or
more formally:
∂st
∂t
=
∂st
∂υt
(2.3.4)
For the same size shock, the signal will increase by the same amount to both shocks. As
consumption is a linear function of the signal, consumption also responds in the same way
to both shocks:
∂ct
∂t
=
∂ct
∂υt
(2.3.5)
In other words, on impact consumers respond in the same way to technology and noise
shocks, as they only observe the increase in the signal and are not able to differentiate
between the two shocks.
This implies that running a VAR model with consumption and the signal results in a
singular system. Moreover, if we extended our model with additional observables, such
as stock prices, consumer sentiment or growth forecasts, this would not help to identify
the shocks. In particular, so long as those observables are a linear function of the signal,
we will have that:
∂xt
∂t
=
∂xt
∂υt
(2.3.6)
To show the problems related to the use of a VAR model in such a case, we perform
the following exercise: we use simulated data to estimate a non-singular VAR model with
consumption and the signal by adding a measurement error to the signal.3 Technology and
noise shocks are identified by theoretically consistent long-run restrictions: the technology
shock is identified as a shock with permanent effects on consumption and the noise shock
is a shock with only transitory effects.
The impulse responses of consumption to those shocks are plotted in Figure B.4, which
shows that such an approach is not able to correctly identify the two shocks. While the
first shock is permanent, it does not build up slowly, as with our theory-based technology
shock, but jumps on impact. Similarly, we expect that the identified transitory shock
would be a mixture of the measurement error and the theoretical noise shock. Figure
B.4 shows that, unlike the structural shock, consumption does not respond at all to the
identified transitory shock.
The above principles do not hold for the reaction of consumption in later periods. In
3The Measurement error is assumed to be a white noise process with N (0, 0.0001σ2υ)
55
2.3. From the model to a structural VAR
other words, we have that:
∂st+j
∂t
6= ∂st+j
∂υt
∀ j = 1, 2, ... → ∂ct+j
∂t
6= ∂ct+j
∂υt
∀ j = 1, 2, ... (2.3.7)
As consumers begin to differentiate between the two shocks, via the Kalman filter, the
response of consumption differs in the periods following the shocks.
2.3.2 Consumers vs. Econometricians
The preceding discussion shows that to identify shocks we have to use a superior infor-
mation set than that available to consumers. To start with an extreme situation, let us
assume that the econometrician has access to time series of technology and can infer the
consumers’ forecast error:
ηt = Et[at|It]− at (2.3.8)
Technology responds differently to the two shocks:
1 =
∂at
∂t
6= ∂at
∂υt
= 0 (2.3.9)
and since the forecast error is a linear function of technology and the signal, it responds
differently to the two shocks:
∂ηt
∂t
6= ∂ηt
∂υt
(2.3.10)
This fact is implicitly used in Enders et al. [2013] and Forni et al. [2013] to justify the
identification of noise shocks. In the former paper, the authors use the assumption that
forecast errors are observable at the end of the period and therefore the econometrician
has access to forecast errors that can be directly included in a VAR. Similarly, Forni
et al. [2013] assume that potential output is revealed after one period and therefore the
econometrician can retrieve forecast errors. Had we assumed that the econometrician has
access to forecast errors, for example by observing utilization, we would also be able to
exactly identify the shocks, as is shown by the simulations presented in Figure B.7.
However, in reality, the econometrician cannot observe the true technology and the
related forecast errors. In a less extreme situation, we can assume that the econometrician
does not have access to perfect information about the state of the economy, but can have
access to superior information than the agents.
How well can the econometrician approximate the forecast error by using a superior
information set, Iet ? We can define the forecast errors and the econometrician’s estimate
of the forecast errors as:
ηt = Et[at|It]− at → ηˆt = Et[at|It]− Et[at|Iet ] (2.3.11)
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In the extreme case described above, when the econometrician has perfect information,
Et[at|Iet ] = at, and the econometrician would be able to exactly recover the forecast
error, ηˆt = ηt. Note that, in the opposite extreme, if the econometrician has the same
information set as the agents, their estimate of the forecast error is 0.
With a more plausible situation, there are two ways in which the econometrician can
use superior information to achieve a more precise estimate of the state of economy, i.e.
achieve var(Et[at|Iet ]− at) < var(Et[at|It]− at):
• Using more accurate signals: var[υt|Iet ] < var[υt|It]
• Using future observations: It ⊂ Iet
Using more accurate signals
In the real world, consumers and firms have to base their decisions on real-time data. As
shown for instance by Diebold and Rudebusch [1991], forecast errors tend to be larger
when using real-time data compared with those based on revised data.
It can be shown that:
lim
σ2υ→0
E[Et[at|Iet ]− at] = 0 (2.3.12)
which implies that in the limit, when the signal becomes perfectly informative, we can
exactly recover the state and the forecast error, ηt. We can also show that:
σ2υ < σ
2∗
υ → var[ηt|σ2υ] < var[ηt|σ2∗υ ] (2.3.13)
which implies that more informative signals help to decrease the forecast error and the
more precise the signal, the greater the decrease in the forecast error.
In order to see how more accurate signals help to estimate the forecast error, we run
a simulation where consumers have a signal with the baseline variance, σ2υ, while the
econometrician can use a signal with smaller variance to predict the state. The estimate
of the forecast error is then constructed as ηˆt = Et[at|It]−Et[at|Iet ], where the difference in
consumers’ and the econometrician’s information sets, It and Iet , relates to the difference
in the variance of the signal.
Figure B.5 shows how the estimated forecast error evolves according to the quality
of the signal. The black lines show the errors implied by the theoretical models after a
permanent and a noise shock. When the signal becomes less noisy, the lines move closer
to the theoretical impulse responses and the correlation between the estimated and the
true forecast errors increase rapidly when the variance of the noise is reduced.4
4How much the reduction in the variance of the noise shocks contributes to the better estimate of the
forecast error depends on the correlation between the improvements in the signal and the noise shock.
When newly defined noise shocks with lower variance can be written as υ∗t = aυt, implying that the
correlation between improvement in the signal and the noise shocks is perfect, the improvement in the
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Using future observations
The econometrician can also potentially observe a larger dataset, including ‘future’ data.
By contrast, consumers cannot observe ‘future’ realizations. If we define Ie.jt = {st+j,
st+j−1, st+j−2, ...}, we can show:5
var[Et[at|Ie.(j+h)t ]− at] < var[Et[at|Ie.jt ]− at] ∀ h = 1, 2, ... (2.3.14)
which implies that having access to future signals helps to decrease the forecast error and
the more leads are available, the greater the decrease.
In general, future data does not perfectly reveal the true state of technology and there-
fore the true forecast error, ηt. The gain one obtains by using future observations depends
on the variance of the signal - the lower is the variance of the signal, the greater is the
improvement in estimation accuracy that we can obtain by including future observations.
We perform another simulation allowing the econometrician to observe different num-
ber of leads of the signal. The forecast error is then estimated as:
ηˆt = Et[at|It]− Et[at|Ie.jt ] (2.3.15)
Figure B.6 shows how close to the actual forecast errors the estimated forecast error
can become when we increase the number of leads. For the permanent shock, adding four
leads is almost sufficient to reproduce the shape of the true forecast error. By contrast,
it is more difficult to estimate the forecast error following a noise shock. Nevertheless,
four leads imply an impulse response that is qualitatively similar to what the theoretical
model gives. Overall, the correlation between the estimated and the true forecast errors
is equal to 0.72 with four leads.
It is important to note that it is this improvement in the estimate of at that allows
the econometrician to estimate the forecast error. In fact, from the definition of ηˆt, we
see that the econometrician’s estimate of the forecast error is equal to their correction,
relative to the agents, of the estimate the true state. Thus, we can decompose ηˆt into a
component due to the use of revised data, which we denote by λˆt, and a component due
to the use of future data, denoted by κˆt. All the possible differences can be summarized
in the following table:
signal contributes the most to the better estimate of the forecast error. In this subsection we assumed
correlation between the improvements in the signal and noise shocks is perfect. See also footnote 6.
5See Simon [2006], page 271.
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Table 2.1: Forecast error estimation
Kalman Filter Kalman Smoother
Real time data Consumers’ estimate expectation κˆt
Revised data λˆt Econometrician’s estimate (ηˆt )
Using simulated data, Figure B.10 shows the estimate of the forecast error using
future signals, and its difference with the true forecast error. As shown in the lower
panel, the estimated forecast error matches the patterns of the actual forecast error and
the correlation between the two is relatively high (0.8). Similarly, Figure B.11 shows the
same graphs for an estimate of the forecast error using a less noisy signal. The correlation
between the true forecast error and the estimated one is again high (0.8). Finally, Figure
B.12 shows the estimate of the forecast error that combines the previous two estimates.
The correlation between this final estimate of the forecast error and the true one is very
high (0.93), which supports our strategy.
2.3.3 Approximation with a VAR model
We have seen above that we can approximate the forecast error, ηˆt, by using more precise
data and future values of the signal. We have also shown that if we had access to the
series of forecast errors, ηt, we could use a SVAR model to obtain the series of noise and
technology shocks. Can we still use a SVAR model if we replace the original forecast
errors by approximated forecast errors?
To answer this question, we estimate a SVAR model that includes consumption and
instead of the true forecast error, as in Section 2.2, we use estimates of the forecast errors,
ηˆt. The estimates of forecast errors are obtained by using both future observations and
more precise signals.6
The identification of the shocks is obtained by sign restrictions. From theory, we know
that the forecast error responds negatively to the technology shock and positively to the
noise shock, while consumption responds positively to both. This implies that we can use
the following sign restrictions to identify permanent and noise shocks:
Permanent shock Noise shock
Consumption + +
Forecast error (ηˆt) - +
6 The use of future observations may cause VAR with forecast errors to be singular. However, when
the improvements in the signal are not perfectly correlated with the noise shocks itself, i.e. the newly
defined noise shocks with lower variance cannot be written as υ∗t = aυt, the problem of singularity does
not appear. The detailed explanation can be found in Appendix B.2. In the following exercises we assume
that the correlation between the improvements in the signal and the noise shocks is zero.
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In the following example, we use a 50 percent less noisy signal and four leads of the
signal to produce the econometrician’s estimate of the forecast error, ηˆt .
Figure B.8 compares the theoretical and the estimated impulse responses to a tech-
nology shock (first row) and a noise shock (second row). The shape and size of the two
forecast errors are very similar to the theoretical ones, implying that our sign restriction
strategy is now able to distinguish between a technology and a noise shock. The response
of consumption to these shocks is also similar to what the theoretical model predicts:
after a technology shock, consumption increases gradually and is permanently affected
by the shock; after a noise shock, consumption increases only in the short term and re-
turns gradually to the baseline state after a few periods. Figure B.9 shows the results of
the same exercise by comparing estimated (first row) and theoretical (second row) fore-
cast error variance decompositions (FEVD). The contributions of technological and noise
shocks to the forecast error variance is very similar when comparing the estimated and
the theoretical decompositions. Noise shocks explain most of the variance of consumption
and forecast error in the short-run, while permanent shocks mainly explain the variance
of consumption in the long-run.
2.3.4 Comparison with Forni et al. [2013]
In this subsection we show that methodology proposed in Forni et al. [2013] cannot be
applied to a general signal extraction model as used in this paper and in Blanchard et al.
[2013]. Moreover, we show that our approach can easily accommodate their methodology.
The two crucial equations of the model in Forni et al. [2013] are:
at = at−1 + εt−1 (2.3.16)
st = at + υt (2.3.17)
where at is the observable technology, st is a signal about technology, εt is the technology
shock and υt is the noise shock. The signal extraction problem comes from the fact that
the technology shock has delayed effects on technology ∆at = εt−1. Importantly, contrary
to the general model used in this paper, this framework implies that a VAR including
the current observable technology and the signal is not singular. This is easy to see as
∂st
∂εt
=
∂st
∂υt
, but
∂at
∂εt
6= ∂at
∂υt
and therefore the problem of singularity of the VAR that was
discussed in Section 2.3.1 does not appear in this case.
It is also straightforward to understand why our methodology can be applied to the
model described by (2.3.16) and (2.3.17). Indeed, using one lead of technology enables
to exactly recover the technology shock, ∆at+1 = εt. This implies that the estimated
forecast error is equal to the true forecast error, ηˆt = ηt, and the shocks can be exactly
recovered.
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2.4 Empirical evidence on US data
Given the positive results of the simulations above, we use our methodology to estimate the
effects of news and noise shocks in the US. We first explain how we construct the real-time
data on GDP. We then present our methodology to estimate the forecast errors, before
presenting the VAR model we use to identify noise and technology shocks. We then present
the results, including impulse response analysis, forecast error variance decomposition
and historical decomposition, which are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical
model. Finally, we show that these results are robust to a different identification strategy.
2.4.1 Real-time data
The first step in our procedure is to obtain the real-time data on GDP. ‘Standard’ real-
time data - the first estimates of GDP available in period t from statistical offices - is
normally available only after at least one quarter. In order to be consistent with the
model, we have to construct the measure of real GDP in period t that was available
exactly in period t. To this end, we use GDP forecasts for the current period from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The real time data for real GDP, yrtt , is constructed as:
yrtt = y
∗
t−1 (1 + ∆yˆt) (2.4.1)
where y∗t−1 is the first estimate of real GDP in period t−1 as provided by the statistical
office and ∆yˆt is the forecast for quarterly real GDP growth rate in period t as produced
by the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The calculation of real-time GDP is further complicated by the fact that we are inter-
ested in the GDP level, but a consistent series for the GDP level is not available from the
SPF. Namely, the level forecasts from SPF are affected by changes in national accounts
- for example changes in base years - and it is therefore hard to reconstruct a consistent
measure of the real-time level of GDP. To circumvent this problem, we use a consistent
revised series and use the growth rates based on the first vintages of the data to move
to real-time GDP levels in period t − 1. Specifically, the first estimate of real GDP in
period t− 1 as provided by the statistical office, y∗t−1, is constructed in the following way:
y∗t−1 = yt−5
(
1 + ∆4y∗t−1
)
where yt−5 is the revised GDP data in period t − 5 (based on
the last available vintage in Q2 2012) and ∆4y∗t−1 is the yearly growth rate of real GDP
between t− 5 and t− 1 calculated from the first available vintage for period t− 1, which
is the one available in period t.
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2.4.2 Estimating forecast errors
Methodology
The relevant state variable in the model is technology. However, although it would be
possible to exactly map the model to the empirical applications by assuming technology
as the relevant state, we opt for using trend GDP, or potential output, as the relevant
state. The main reason behind this choice is that real-time data for productivity does
not exist, except in the case of output per hour worked in the business sector, which is
anyway only available since 1998.7 Moreover, in our opinion, firms and consumers focus
on trend GDP rather than technological trend when making economic decisions.
We further assume that consumers use a Kalman filter to construct the estimate of
trend GDP.8 The Kalman filter is set so as to represent a one-sided HP filter, and therefore
has some empirical appeal. On the other hand, the econometrician can use the complete
data sample, so that the econometrician’s estimate of trend GDP is obtained by using a
Kalman smoother. There is also a difference in the nature of the data used. Consumers
can only use real-time data, while the econometrician can use revised data from later
vintages. The correspondance between the model and the empirical application can be
summarized as follows:
• Use of future data - Consumers only use past data and determine trend GDP
with a one-sided filter. The econometrician also uses future data when filtering the
GDP series with a two-sided filter.
• Better signal - Consumers use real-time data. The econometrician, having access
to revised data, uses more accurate information about the state in a given period.
The methodology outlined previously can be applied to actual data. The possible esti-
mates of the forecast errors can then be decomposed as in Table 2.1.
Figure B.13 shows our estimate of κˆt and Figure B.14 our estimate of λˆt on US data.
These figures allows us to see how the final estimate, shown in Figure B.15, is decomposed
into the component due to the use of future signals and the one due the use of less noisy
signals. Of course, as the “true” forecast error is not observable in the data, our best
estimate of it is the final estimate, ηˆt. The correlation between κˆt and ηˆt is 0.68 and
the correlation between λˆt and ηˆt is 0.92. Figure B.15 also shows the forecast error is
pro-cyclical: it is positive and increases in the expansion phase, peaks at the start of a
recession (as defined by the NBER) and then falls, reaching a minimum around two of
years after the end of the recession phase. A positive, rising error can then be interpreted
as an increase in consumers’ optimism up to the end of the expansion phase. The error
7See https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/real-time-data/data-
files/OPH/
8More detail on the methodology is given in Appendix B.3.1.
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becomes negative during the recession and stays negative as long as consumers remain
pessimistic about the economy, thus underpredicting the actual state of the economy.
2.4.3 VAR model
We can now estimate a VAR model that includes the following variables:
• Estimated Forecast Errors (FE)
• GDP (Y)
• Private Consumption (C)
• Investment (I)
• Stock prices (S&P500 - SP)
• Fed funds rate (IR)
• CPI inflation (INF)
• Consumer Sentiment (SENT)
The estimated forecast errors are those defined in the previous subsection. The es-
timation period is from Q1 1970 to Q2 2012. We drop 4 observations at both ends of
the sample to account for the lag/lead structure. The system is estimated in differences
with three lags, and standard errors are calculated using classic bootstrap methods. The
results are robust to changes from differences to levels and using a different number of
lags.
Compared to the theoretical model, we enrich the VAR model by including additional
variables. This allows us to better identify the shocks and to see their impact on these
additional variables, such as stock prices or consumer sentiment. A simple two-variable
VAR model, including only the estimate of the forecast error and consumption, has also
been estimated. The results, available upon request, are not noticeably different from
those presented below.
2.4.4 Identification
The identification of the noise and technology shocks is achieved by sign restrictions.
From the theoretical model we know that:
• The forecast error is positive for positive noise shocks (i.e. consumers are too opti-
mistic).
• The forecast error is negative for positive permanent shocks (i.e. consumers are too
pessimistic).
The other variables respond similarly to both shocks according to the signs summarized
in the following table:
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FE Y C I SP SENT
Permanent shock - + + + +
Noise shock + + + + +
The restrictions are imposed for one year, though changing this does not considerably
change the results. The responses of interest rates and inflation are left unrestricted. The
estimation methodology is described in Appendix in Section B.4.
Clearly, our VAR model implicitly includes other types of shocks, such as monetary
or fiscal shocks. As discussed above, our theoretical model can incorporate other shocks
so long as only the shocks considered, technology and noise shocks, are not observable
contemporaneously, so that other types of shocks do not affect the forecast errors. The
inclusion of other shocks will be discussed as a robustness check in Section 2.4.7.
2.4.5 Empirical results
We now present the estimated impulse response functions, forecast error variance decom-
positions and historical decompositions.
First, Figure B.16 shows impulse response functions (IRFs) following a 1 standard
deviation positive shock to technology. Although we only impose sign restrictions in the
short term, the technology shock implies permanent effects on macroeconomic variables,
as expected from the theory. Indeed output, consumption and investment are permanently
higher. As also expected from the theoretical model, the forecast error is negative with
a maximum impact after 5 quarters, before returning towards the baseline. Inflation
and interest rates decline on impact but are not permanently affected. Interestingly,
both equity prices and consumer sentiment increase permanently following the technology
shock.
Figure B.17 shows IRFs following a 1 standard deviation positive noise shock. In this
case, the forecast error is positive and increases up to the 10th quarter after the shock. As
expected by the theoretical model, the impact on output, investment and consumption
is positive in the short term but the effects are short-lived and the variables return to
baseline after 8 to 10 quarters. Equity prices and sentiment are also affected positively
but, after 5 quarters, the effects are no longer significant. In line with the features of a
demand shock, inflation increases in the short term and interest rates are also higher.
The forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), presented in Figure B.18, shows
that the noise shock explains almost half of the business cycle fluctuations in the short
term. As expected from the theory, the impact of the technology shock on the business
cycle builds up gradually. It explains only up to 20 percent of output variations at
business cycle frequencies and half of the fluctuations in the long term, when the noise
shock contribution is much smaller.
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Figure B.19 shows the series of extracted shocks, with technology shocks in the upper
panel and noise shocks in the lower panel. The patterns between these two shocks are very
different. A few interesting observations are worth pointing out. First, the technology
shock declines just before recessions and sharply increases during the recessions, which
could be interpreted as a Schumpeterian creative-destruction mechanism driving the re-
covery phase. Second, the noise shock tends to be very positive in boom periods, like in
the dot-com bubble in the early 2000s and in the housing market boom from the mid-
2000s to the financial crisis. Third, noise shocks tend to remain negative for a prolonged
period of time after a recession, underlining the role of excess pessimism as a dampening
factor in the recovery phases.
Finally, Figures B.20 and B.21 show the historical decomposition of output and the
contribution of the two shocks to business cycles fluctuations over time. When the per-
manent technology shock is removed, US GDP is much lower, especially over the period
1985-2008. This means that our VAR model attributes much of the increase in GDP to
positive technology shocks during that period. At the same time, the technology shocks do
not contribute so much to short-term fluctuations. By contrast, the noise shock explains
most of the output fluctuations at business cycle frequencies.
2.4.6 Robustness check - long run restrictions
As a robustness check, we use a different identification strategy to verify to what extent the
previous results depend on the sign restrictions we imposed. We use long-run restrictions
instead of sign restrictions to identify the technology and noise shocks.
In particular, restrictions the noise shock is identified by imposing that it has transitory
effects on consumption.9 In a small-scale VAR with only consumption and the forecast
error, we identify the permanent and transitory shocks to consumption using the following
restrictions on the matrix of long run effects, Ξ:
Ξ =
[
∗ 0
∗ ∗
]
(2.4.2)
Figure B.22 shows the impulse responses of consumption and the forecast error to the
permanent shock, in the upper panel, and the transitory shock, in the lower panel. The
responses are qualitatively similar to those obtained with the sign restriction approach.
In particular, without imposing the sign restrictions, we again find that a positive perma-
nent technology shock implies negative forecast errors in the short term, while a positive
transitory shock increases the forecast error being in this case positive.
9Note that while many shocks other than “animal spirits” are compatible with such a restriction, the
purpose of this robustness check is to distinguish between the two shocks included in our theoretical
model.
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2.4.7 Robustness check - additional shock
Our empirical results have so far been based on the identification of the two shocks defined
in our theoretical model, distinguishing the noise and technology shocks by their impact
on the forecast errors. In our VAR model, which includes more variables, we have so far
grouped all other disturbances as “other shocks”. As we discussed, the difference is that
these other shocks must not have any impact on the forecast errors contemporaneously, as
they are supposed to be observable. This is the main constraint given by our theoretical
model regarding noise and news shocks. Here, we try to identify some of these other shocks
in order to distinguish, among the transitory shocks, those that are related with “animal
spirits” from those that are related to more standard shocks, in particular aggregate
demand shocks.
Indeed, Lorenzoni [2009] interprets noise shocks, as defined in our paper, as aggre-
gate demand shocks. However, other types of demand shocks may not be related to
expectations about future technology. Fiscal shocks or preference shocks may fall into
the category of demand shocks that are observable contemporaneously. In this case, the
difference between the noise shocks and such a demand shock will only be the effect on
the forecast error, which will be positive in the case of a noise shock and zero in the case
of an observable demand shock. We use this zero restriction to identify a third shock,
which we name an observable demand shock. Figure B.25 shows the IRFs of this newly
identified shock. It has positive effects on output and consumption, although these effects
are only significant in the short term. Similarly, the positive impact on stock prices and
consumer sentiment are significant only in the first quarters following the shock. Figures
B.23 and B.24 show the IRFs to the permanent shock and the noise shock in this new
system. The responses are relatively similar to those presented earlier. Compared with
the noise shock, the effect of the observable demand shock builds up more gradually. As
shown by the FEVD, in Figure B.26, the observable demand shock explains a large share
of fluctuations in consumption in the medium- to long-term, while the noise shock explains
most of the fluctuations in consumption in the short term. The same largely applies to
output fluctuations. For consumption, almost half of the fluctuations are explained by
these three shocks. For output, they explain almost two-third of the fluctuations. The
main conclusions derived earlier still hold in this more comprehensive shock identification
exercise.
Two other extended identifications have also been estimated. The first considers an
additional shock that has maximum effect on output, and minimal effects on the forecast
error. This shock is assumed to also explain investment increases. The purpose of this
shock is to potentially account for part of the variation captured in our noise shock in
the initial identification scheme. Impulse responses are shown in Figures B.27, B.28 and
B.29 and the FEVD is presented in Figure B.30. As with the previous robustness check,
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the additional shock, while capturing part of the output fluctuations, does not change the
main results, in particular the contribution of the noise shock to output remains broadly
unchanged.
A final robustness check distinguishes, in addition to the noise and permanent shocks,
a third shock which behaves as a demand shock and a fourth one which behaves like
a supply shock. In this exercise, the identification is conducted by assuming that the
demand shock leads to an increase in both inflation and interest rates, while the supply
shock is assumed to lead to decreases in these two variables. Figures B.31, B.32, B.33 and
B.34 show impulse responses to each of these four shocks. Figure B.35 shows the FEVD.
While the two additional shocks are able to explain part of the output fluctuations, the
contribution of the two main shocks,noise and permanent shocks, remain very close to
our baseline exercise.
2.4.8 Comparison with current literature
Our results correspond to a large extent with those found in related literature. In partic-
ular, most papers that study the effects of noise versus permanent shocks find that noise
shocks could be interpreted as demand shocks and contribute to a large extent to eco-
nomic fluctuations at business cycle frequency. Noise shocks are therefore more important
in explaining the business cycles compared to permanent or technology shocks.
Blanchard et al. [2013] estimate a structural model and find that noise shocks account
for more than 50% of short run volatility of consumption, while permanent technology
shocks play a smaller role, having almost no effect on quarterly volatility and explaining
less than 30% at a 4-quarter horizon. Similar to this paper, they find spells of positive
permanent shocks in the first half of 80s and second half of 90s. They estimate a structural
model, thus putting structure on the data that can have important effects on the final
results. By contrast, we opted for a more parsimonious SVAR model, which suggests why
the smoothed series of noise shocks are more informative in our case - we obtain a clearer
pattern of positive noise shocks before recessions and negative noise shocks at the start
and during recessions. Nevertheless, they also find a succession of negative noise shocks
around the recession in the early 1990s, and a spell of positive noise shocks before the
2001 recession.10
Given their methodology, Forni et al. [2013] identify two additional shocks, which
makes direct comparison slightly more difficult. Nonetheless, overall, their results are
similar to those found in our paper. The responses of output, consumption and investment
have similar shapes. In the case of the noise shock, the responses are hump-shaped with
a relatively small, although significant, impact effect; they reach a maximum after about
two years, then decline towards zero after about five years. As predicted by the model,
10They do not find similar patterns before the 2007 recession, as they only use data until 2008.
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noise shocks spur a wave of private consumption and investment which vanishes once
economic agents realize that the signal was just noise. They find that the responses
to real shocks are permanent, although real shocks sometimes do not have significantly
permanent effects as in our paper.
Enders et al. [2013] use a similar empirical strategy to our paper, but they construct
forecast errors only by exploring the fact that real-time data is less precise than revised
data. Nevertheless, they also find that nowcast errors react as predicted by theory, as we
found in the exercise in Section 2.4.6. Given that they only use the difference between
real-time and revised data to improve the estimates of the state, their results are not
as revealing as those found in this and other studies. Namely, the distinction between
productivity shocks as permanent and optimism shocks as transitory is not as evident as
in other studies.
Barsky and Sims [2012] found most contrasting results compared to this and other
papers in the literature. They find that “animal spirits” effects are very weak and thus
account for essentially none of the relationship between confidence and future consump-
tion or income. The reason for such contrasting results is mostly related to the different
methodologies - they estimate a structural model by matching theoretical impulse re-
sponses with empirical impulse responses. As discussed above, estimating a structural
model imposes structure on the data that may have important effects on the empirical
results. While they find noise shocks to be unimportant, they find that permanent shocks
are important drivers of business cycles, especially at longer horizons.
Finally, Angeletos et al. [2014] features a model with only two sources of volatility:
the usual technology shock and a confidence shock that drives the agents’ beliefs about
the state of the economy. The confidence shock therefore has a similar interpretation
to our noise shock. Interestingly enough, although they use a different model, they also
find that confidence shocks can account for about half of GDP volatility at business-cycle
frequencies and that their effects look similar to a standard demand shock.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a model in which consumers receive noisy signals about future
economic fundamentals. In this model, business cycle fluctuations can be driven both
by news shocks (technology shocks) and noise shocks (“animal spirits” shocks). We have
shown that standard structural VAR models cannot be applied in principle to this model
to identify the two types of shocks, as the VAR model faces invertibility issues. In other
words, if consumers cannot distinguish between the two shocks, the econometrician also
faces the same problem. However, by considering that the econometrician can potentially
have a richer and more accurate information set, we have shown that a standard SVAR
model can recover both technology and noise shocks. Richer information sets relate to the
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fact that the econometrician has access to revised data (while consumers take decisions
with real-time data) and can include “future” data when estimating the state of the
economy (while consumers take decisions with past and current data only).
In the empirical exercise, we have shown that the identified shocks have macroeconomic
impacts that are in line with theoretical predictions. We have also shown that noise shocks
explain almost half of business cycle fluctuations in the short term, while technology
shocks explain only up to 20 percent of output variations at business cycle frequencies.
We have also shown that technology shocks turn negative a few years before recessions,
while noise shocks are very positive at the cycle peaks and remain negative for some time
during recovery phases. The recovery from recessions is mostly led by technology shocks,
following Schumpeterian creative-destructive dynamics. These results are robust to the
size of the VAR model and to the identification scheme.
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Appendix: Animal Spirits,
Fundamental Factors and Business
Cycle Fluctuations
B.1 Appendix - Model
Figure B.1: Simulated Technology, Signal and Cons. expectations and Forecast error
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The black line represents the underlying technology process, which agents do not observe. The agents observe a signal
(blue line) and via a Kalman filter, they form expectations about the technology (red line). The difference between their
expectations and the true state of technology - forecast error - is represented in the graph below with the green line.
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Figure B.2: IRFs to the Permanent shock
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10−3
 
 
Signal
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10−3
 
 
Technology
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10−3
 
 
Exp current state
5 10 15 20
−9
−8
−7
−6
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
x 10−4
 
 
Forecast error
5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 10−3
 
 
Consumption
5 10 15 20
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
x 10−4
 
 
Utilization
The graph presents the impulse responses of variables to the one-standard deviation permanent shock. The top row presents
responses of signal, technology and agent’s expectation. The bottom row presents responses of forecast error, consumption
and utilization.
Figure B.3: IRF to the Noise shock
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The graph presents the impulse responses of variables to the one-standard deviation noise shock. The top row presents
responses of signal, technology and agent’s expectations. The bottom row presents responses of forecast error, consumption
and utilization.
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Figure B.4: IRF of consumption
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The graph presents the estimated impulse responses of consumption to the permanent (above) and the noise (below) shock.
The black lines are theoretical responses. The blue line is point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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B.2 Appendix - Singularity of VAR with leads
To see the problem related to the singularity of VAR models when the future values of
signals are used, we define an estimate of the state by a Kalman filter as:
xˆtt = xˆ
t
t−1 +K
(
st − Axˆtt−1
)
= (1−KA)xˆtt−1 +Kst
(B.2.1)
where xˆtt is a state estimate in period t using signals up to period t - an estimate derived
with a standard Kalman filter. K is the Kalman gain and st is the signal in period t.
Similarly, the state estimate in period t using signals up to period t+ 1 can be written as:
xˆt+1t = xˆ
t+1
t−1 +K0
(
st − A0xˆt+1t−1
)
+K1 (st+1 − A1xˆt+1t−1)
= (1−K0A0 −K1A1)xˆt+1t−1 +K0st +K1st+1
(B.2.2)
where xˆt+1t is a state estimate in period t using signals up to period t + 1. K0 is the
Kalman gain related to the signal in period t and K1 is the Kalman gain related to the
signal in period t+ 1.
Consider now that the state estimate, xˆtt follows an autoregressive process:
1
xˆtt = β1xˆ
t
t−1 + ut (B.2.3)
where ut is the error term. Comparing equation (B.2.1) with equation (B.2.3), we can see
that st and ut span the same linear space.
Shifting by one period and rearranging equations (B.2.1) and (B.2.2) we have:
xˆtt−1 − (1−KA)xˆtt−2 = Kst−1
xˆt+1t−1 − (1−K0A0 −K1A1)xˆt+1t−2 = K0st−1 +K1st
(B.2.4)
where the first row follows from equation (B.2.1) and the second row from equation (B.2.2).
From equation (B.2.4), we can see that st can be expressed as a linear combination of xˆ
t
t−1,
xˆtt−2, xˆ
t+1
t−1 and xˆ
t+1
t−2. As st and ut span the same linear space, ut can also be expressed as
a linear combination of the latter four variables, which implies a regression of the form:
xˆtt = β1xˆ
t
t−1 + β2xˆ
t
t−2 + β3xˆ
t+1
t−1 + β4xˆ
t+1
t−2 + ut (B.2.5)
is characterized by a perfect linear relation between the independent and dependent vari-
ables, and the corresponding VAR is therefore singular. A similar reasoning applies also
to regressions involving state estimates xˆt+2t , xˆ
t+3
t ,... that are constructed by using more
1The results in this section are presented only for auto-regressions with the state estimate. However,
the forecast error, ηt, and consumption, ct, are a linear function of the state estimate xˆ
i
t and therefore
results also hold for auto-regressions with the forecast error and consumption.
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leads of the signal. The only difference is that the more leads of the signal are used to
construct state estimates, the more lags are needed to achieve a perfect linear correlation.
The improvements in the signal - lower variance of noise shocks - can reduce the
problem of singularity. Whenever improvements in the signals are perfectly correlated
with the noise shocks itself - newly defined noise shocks with lower variance can be written
as υ∗t = aυt, where υ
∗
t are noise shocks with lower variance, a is a constant and υt are
old shocks - the reduced variance of the signals does not alter the singularity problem.
Namely, st can still be expressed as a (different) linear combination of xˆ
t
t−1, xˆ
t
t−2, xˆ
t+1
t−1
and xˆt+1t−2.
On the other hand, when correlation is not perfect - noise shocks with lower variance
cannot be written as υ∗t = aυt - the singularity problem does not appear. To see this, we
can write equation (B.2.4) as:
xˆtt−1 − (1−KA)xˆtt−2 = Kst−1
xˆt+1t−1 − (1−K0A0 −K1A1)xˆt+1t−2 = K0s∗t−1 +K1s∗t
(B.2.6)
where we use the fact that we have access to a different signal in the future, s∗t 6= st
(second row). The new signal cannot be written as s∗t = cst, where c is some constant.
Therefore, it is not possible to form a perfect linear relation between st and xˆ
t
t−1, xˆ
t
t−2,
xˆt+1t−1 and xˆ
t+1
t−2.
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Figure B.5: Estimated Forecast error from less noisy signal
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Figure B.6: Estimated Forecast error from using future observations
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Figure B.7: Estimated IRF by using the true forecast errors
(simulated data)
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The graph presents the estimated impulse responses of consumption (right) and the forecast error (left) to the permanent
(above) and the noise (below) shock. The blue line is point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
Figure B.8: Estimated IRF by using estimated forecast errors
(simulated data)
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The graph presents the estimated impulse responses of consumption (right) and the forecast error (left) to the permanent
(above) and the noise (below) shock. The estimated forecast errors are obtained by using 4 leads of the signal and 50
percent less noisy signal. The black lines are theoretical responses. The blue line is point estimate and the red lines are
90% error bands.
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Figure B.9: Simulated data: Estimated FEVD (above) and theoretical FEVD (below)
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The first row presents the estimated forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of consumption (right) and the forecast
error (left). The second row presents the theoretical forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD) of consumption (right)
and the forecast error (left). The blue area corresponds to the median contribution of the permanent and the green area
corresponds to the median contribution of the noise shock. The estimated forecast errors are obtained by using 4 leads of
the signal and 50 percent less noisy signal.
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B.3 Appendix - Estimation of trend GDP
B.3.1 HP filter in a state space form
The HP-filter widely used in practice decomposes time series yt, in our case GDP, into a
trend component and a cyclical component, can be represented as:2
yt = τt + t (B.3.1)
(1− L)2τt = ηt (B.3.2)
where τt is a trend component, {t} is a white noise sequence (cyclical component) and
{ηt} is a white noise sequence. The following process can be written as a state space:
1. State Equation[
τt|t
τt−1|t
]
=
[
2 −1
1 0
][
τt−1|t−1
τt−2|t−1
]
+
[
1 0
0 0
][
t
0
]
(B.3.3)
2. Observation Equation
yt =
[
1 0
] [ τt|t
τt−1|t
]
+
[
0 1
] [ 0
ηt
]
(B.3.4)
where t ∼ N (0, σ2 ) and ηt ∼ N (0, σ2η). The standard parameter lambda is obtained as,
λ =
σ2η
σ2
.
The one-sided HP filter is obtained by estimating the state space system by a Kalman
filter, while non-casual estimate of the state-space system is obtained by a Kalman
smoother. The alternative to obtain non-casual filter estimates of the trend and cyclical
component is to use a standard two-sided HP filter.
2 See Stock and Watson [1999]
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Figure B.10: An estimate of forecast error due to the use of future signals - κˆt
(simulated data)
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The black line represents the true technology. The red line represents the expectations that are obtained via Kalman filter
with the structure of HP filter. The blue line represents the expectations that are obtained via Kalman smoother with the
structure of HP filter. The green line represents the difference between the two series of expectations, which is a proxy for
the forecast error estimated due to the usage of future values. The black line are the true forecast errors.
Figure B.11: An estimate of forecast error due to the use of less noisy signals - λˆt
(simulated data)
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The black line represents the true technology. The red line represents the expectations that are obtained via Kalman
filter with the structure of HP filter using the real-time data. The blue line represents the expectations that are obtained
via Kalman filter with the structure of HP filter using the revised data (less noisy signal). The green line represents the
difference between the two series of expectations, which is a proxy for the forecast error estimated due to the usage of
revised data. The black line are the true forecast errors.
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Figure B.12: A final estimate of forecast error - ηˆt
(simulated data)
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The black line represents the true technology. The red line represents the expectations that are obtained via Kalman filter
with the structure of HP filter using the real-time data. The blue line represents the expectations that are obtained via
Kalman smoother with the structure of HP filter using the revised data (less noisy signal). The green line represents the
difference between the two series of expectations, which is a proxy for the forecast error estimated due to the usage of
revised data. The black line are the true forecast errors.
Figure B.13: An estimate of forecast error due to the use of future signals - κˆt
(US data)
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Difference one−sided and two−sided fitler: Real time data
corr(κˆt, ηt) = 0.68
The red line represents the trend GDP that is obtained via Kalman filter with the structure of HP filter. The blue line
represents the trend GDP that is obtained via Kalman smoother with the structure of HP filter. The green line represents
the difference between the two estimated trends, which is a proxy for the forecast error estimated due to the usage of future
values.
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Figure B.14: An estimate of forecast error due to the use of less noisy signals - λˆt
(US data)
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The red line represents the trend GDP that is obtained via Kalman filter with the structure of HP filter using real-time
data. The blue line represents the trend GDP that is obtained via Kalman filter with the structure of HP filter using revised
data. The green line represents the difference between the two estimated trends, which is a proxy for the forecast error
estimated due to the usage of more precise signals.
Figure B.15: A final estimate of forecast error - ηˆt
(US data)
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The red line represents the trend GDP that is obtained via Kalman filter with the structure of HP filter using real-time
data. The blue line represents the trend GDP that is obtained via Kalman smoother with the structure of HP filter using
revised data. The green line represents the difference between the two estimated trends, which is a proxy for the forecast
error.
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B.4 Appendix - Estimation algorithm
The estimation procedure is based on a modified version of the sign restriction approach
presented in Uhlig [2005]. The modification is that we restrict responses of most variables
only by non-negativity constraints - in the spirit of sign restrictions approach proposed
in Canova and Nicolo´ [2002].
The estimation procedure consists of three steps. In the first step, we estimate the
reduced form VAR model. In the second step, we identify the structural shocks and
take into account identification uncertainty. The third step serves to take into account
estimation uncertainty. The steps are:
1. Estimate reduced-form VAR: Given the number of chosen lags, p̂, V AR(p̂) is
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to obtain an estimate of autoregressive
coefficients and the variance-covariance of reduced form errors, Σ̂u.
2. Identification restrictions: The non-structural impulse response function, C(L),
is related to the structural impulse response function asB(L) = A0C(L) and reduced
form errors, ut, are related to structural errors as ut = A
−1
0 Bεt. Impact matrix,
S = A−10 B, must satisfy:
Σu = SS
′ (B.4.1)
The first estimate of impact matrix, Sˆ, is obtained by a Cholesky decomposition
of the variance-covariance matrix of reduced form errors, Sˆ = chol(Σˆu). The full
set of permissible impact matrices can be construct as, S∗ = SˆQ, where Q is an
orthonormal matrix such that, QQ′ = I.
Define bi,j(k) to be a response of variable i to shock j in period k that follows from
the structural lag-polynomial B(L)B. Define the function f on the real line per
f(x) = x if x ≥ 0 and f(x) = 100x if x ≤ 0. Let sj be the standard error of variable
j. Let JS,+ be the index set of variables for which identification restricts response to
be positive and let JS,− be the index set of variables for which identification restricts
response to be negative. Define the penalty function as:
Ψ(S) =
∑
j∈JS,+
P∑
k=0
f
(
bi,j(k)
sj
)
+
∑
j∈JS,−
P∑
k=0
f
(
bi,j(k)
sj
)
(B.4.2)
where P is the horizon over which restrictions should hold. Let CS,+ be the index set
of variables for which identification restricts response to be non-negative and let CS,−
be the index set of variables for which identification restricts response to be non-
positive. Define the non-negativity constraints vector as c(S) = [
bi,j(k)
sj
1
, ...,
bi,j(k)
sj
P
].
To identify the model, we solve the following maximization problem:
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S = argmax
S
Ψ(S)
subject to c(S) ≥ 0
SS ′ = Σu
(B.4.3)
In the current paper only restrictions on forecast error enter the penalty function,
while sign restrictions on other variables are applied only as non-negativity con-
straints. In this way we achieved that most of the forecast variance of forecast
error is explained by the two identified shocks, while at the same time achieving
that identification is not too restrictive - our methodology restricts only the sign of
responses and does not maximize the magnitude - in relation to responses of other
variables.
3. Estimation uncertainty: to account for estimation uncertainty, we repeat steps
1-2 1000 times, each time with a new artificially constructed data sample, Y ∗.
To construct data samples, we use re-sampling of errors. To correct for small-
sample bias, we use the method described in Kilian [1998]. New data sample is
constructed recursively as y∗t = Aˆ
∗
1y
∗
t−1 + ... + Aˆ
∗
Ny
∗
t−N + ût
∗, starting from initial
values [y0, ..., yN−1]. Aˆ∗n are estimated reduced form autoregressive coefficients. ût
∗
are drawn randomly with replacement from estimated reduced form errors, ût.
The IRF’s point estimates and the related confidence bands are constructed by re-
taining the relevant percentiles of a distribution of retained IRFs. The same procedure is
used to construct FEVD’s point estimates and the related confidence bands.
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B.5 Appendix - Baseline results
Figure B.16: US data - IRFs to permanent shock
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the permanent shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption
(first row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is
the point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
Figure B.17: US data - IRFs to noise shock
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the noise shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first
row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is the
point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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Figure B.18: US data - FEVD
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The graph presents the forecast error decomposition of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first row),
investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row). The blue area corresponds
to the median contribution of permanent shocks, the green area to the median contribution of noise shocks and yellow area
to the contribution of all other non-identified shocks.
Figure B.19: US data - extracted shocks (smoothed)
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The graph presents the extracted permanent (blue line above) and noise shocks (red line below). The series of shocks are
smoothed with moving average filter with 5-period window. The gray areas correspond to NBER-defined recessions.
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Figure B.20: US data - historical decomposition of output (permanent shocks off)
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The graph presents the historical decomposition of output. The red line is output, while blue line is output in case when
we set permanent shocks to zero in all the periods. The difference between the two series of output is presented with the
green line in the graph below.
Figure B.21: US data - historical decomposition of output (noise shocks off)
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The graph presents the historical decomposition of output. The red line is output, while blue line is output in case when
we set noise shocks to zero in all the periods. The difference between the two series of output is presented with the green
line in the graph below.
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Figure B.22: US data - IRFs with long-run restrictions
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The graph presents the impulse responses of consumption and the estimated forecast error to the permanent shock (above)
and to the transitory shock (below). The identification restrictions rely on long-run restrictions. The blue line is the point
estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
Figure B.23: US data - IRFs to permanent shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the permanent shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption
(first row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is
the point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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Figure B.24: US data - IRFs to noise shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the noise shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first
row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is the
point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
Figure B.25: US data - IRFs to ‘third’ shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the ‘demand’ shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption
(first row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is
the point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
89
B.6. Appendix - Additional results
Figure B.26: US data - FEVD (extended identification)
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The graph presents the forecast error decomposition of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first row),
investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row). The blue area corresponds
to the median contribution of permanent shocks, the green area to the median contribution of noise shocks and yellow area
to the contribution of all other non-identified shocks.
Figure B.27: US data - IRFs to permanent shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the noise shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first
row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is the
point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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Figure B.28: US data - IRFs to noise shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the noise shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first
row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is the
point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
Figure B.29: US data - IRFs to ‘third’ shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the ‘demand’ shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption
(first row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is
the point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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Figure B.30: US data - FEVD (extended identification)
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The graph presents the forecast error decomposition of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first row),
investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row). The blue area corresponds
to the median contribution of permanent shocks, the green area to the median contribution of noise shocks and yellow area
to the contribution of all other non-identified shocks.
Figure B.31: US data - IRFs to permanent shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the noise shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first
row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is the
point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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Figure B.32: US data - IRFs to noise shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the noise shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first
row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is the
point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
Figure B.33: US data - IRFs to ‘supply’ shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the impulse responses to the ‘demand’ shock of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption
(first row), investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row).The blue line is
the point estimate and the red lines are 90% error bands.
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Figure B.34: US data - IRFs to ‘demand’ shock (extended identification)
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The graph presents the forecast error decomposition of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first row),
investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row). The blue area corresponds
to the median contribution of permanent shocks, the green area to the median contribution of noise shocks and yellow area
to the contribution of all other non-identified shocks.
Figure B.35: US data - FEVD (extended identification)
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The graph presents the forecast error decomposition of the estimated forecast error, output and consumption (first row),
investment, stock prices and interest rates (second row) and inflation and sentiment (third row). The blue area corresponds
to the median contribution of permanent shocks, the green area to the median contribution of noise shocks and yellow area
to the contribution of all other non-identified shocks.
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Chapter 3
Spillovers during Euro Area
Sovereign Debt Crisis: a Network
Analysis with Absolute Magnitude
Restrictions
joint with Roberto De Santis
3.1 Introduction
Spillover effects were central to the propogation of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro
area. World leaders and policy makers were confronted with the possibility that spillover
effects could endanger countries with otherwise sound economic fundamentals. Such fear
was the main driver in justifying the bailout measures. “This is about nothing less than
the future of Europe and the future of Germany in Europe,” said the German chancellor
Angela Merkel when she was defending the 120 billion e bailout package for Greece.
In this paper, we measure spillovers, connectedness and contagion across sovereign debt
markets in the euro area countries, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States
(US), using a new method to identify country specific disturbances that allow us to single
out the sources of spillovers, and investigate how such measures have changed during the
euro area sovereign debt crisis.
The literature has studied issues of spillovers and contagion using a variety of econo-
metric approaches, which are summarized in Forbes [2012]. One of the key messages of
this literature is that the identification of shocks is the main challenge in estimating the
spillover effects and separating the degree of interconnectedness from contagion. With
regards to connectedness, Diebold and Yılmaz [2014] suggest a measure based on the
importance of a market specific shock for other markets, using the forecast error variance
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decomposition (FEVD). The FEVD is typically calculated using the generalized impulse-
response functions (GIRFs) of Koop et al. [1996] and Pesaran and Shin [1998]. This
method allows for correlation between shocks to different markets, by using the histor-
ically observed distribution of the shocks. However, this identification scheme does not
provide a causal direction of the spillovers from one market to another. In addition, shocks
extracted with this method are not orthogonal.
Given these shortcomings, we propose a method that allows us to pin down the sources
of spillover effects, and provides a casual interpretation from one market to another mar-
ket. The method we suggest relies on the assumption that the magnitude of the instan-
taneous direct effect of the shock is greater than the magnitude of the instantaneous
spillover. Formally, letting ψij be the instantaneous response of country i to a shock in
country j, our identification scheme requires that |ψij| < |ψjj| ∀ i 6= j. In other words, a
shock to country j’s yield, denoted εj, is the shock which has a higher absolute instanta-
nous effect on j’s yield than any other country i’s yield. In addition, we identify country
specific shocks by imposing orthogonality among the shocks. This allows us to provide a
causal direction of the spillover from one market to another.
This methodology is closely related to both Kilian and Murphy [2012] and De Graeve
and Karas [2014]. Both studies use sign restrictions with elasticity bounds on the impulse
responses to identify shocks. This approach allows them to decrease the admissible set
of accepted models using external prior restrictions. We employ a similar idea, because
we use bounds on the impact matrix to identify shocks, but we do not impose sign re-
strictions. Our approach is useful when one wants to remain agnostic about the sign of
the response functions, and the theory only provides information on the relative size of
the responses. The method is particularly suited to study spillovers, or connectedness, in
the sovereign debt markets during the financial crisis, when the channels of interconnec-
tions were sometimes positive (i.e. flight-to-safety and flight-to liquidity) and sometimes
negative (i.e. contagion), and so we do not want to restrict the sign of the effects a-priori.
Our identification method has several advantages over the use of GIRFs. First, it
provides a directional measure of spillovers between markets by imposing orthogonal-
ity between market specific shocks. Second, it allows for asymmetric responses between
countries. Third, in general, our method produces more precise estimates of spillovers and
interconnections than alternative identification methods, such as GIRFs or zero restric-
tions. We show, through Monte Carlo simulations, that the median estimate of spillovers
or connectedness obtained with our procedure is close to the true values. Finally, the
suggested restrictions can be used together with other a-priori restrictions in order to get
more efficient estimates.
Armed with this new methodology, we study the degree of connectedness, spillover and
contagion among the euro area, UK and US sovereign debt markets. We use daily data
on the yields on 10-year sovereign bonds, over the period January 2005 - August 2014,
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controlling for other global shocks using the monetary policy rates. Using the FEVDs
based on our identification, we find that total connectedness among sovereign markets
declined steadily from October 2009 to the beginning of 2013 because connectedness
among euro area countries fell. Using counter-factual experiments, we show that this
reduction in connectedness is not due to changes in the size of shocks, but to a fall
in cross-market linkages. Cross-market linkages, or contagion a` la Forbes and Rigobon
[2002], increased from the beginning of the inter-bank credit crisis in August 2007 up
to the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008. They declined steadily in 2009 and fell
sharply since the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis in the autumn of 2009.
Cross-market linkages reached the lowest point at the beginning of 2013, remained weak
in 2013 and rose substantially in 2014. Hence, the results support the hypothesis that
during the sovereign debt crisis bond markets were highly fragmented.
We also find that sovereign debt markets are highly interconnected: none of the 12
sovereign yields we consider are insulated from shocks from other markets. Interestingly,
over the sample period 2005-2014, the euro area sovereign debt market has been relatively
insulated from shocks in the UK and the US. However, in May 2013, when investors
perceived a change in US monetary policy, shocks to US sovereign yields became the
most important factor influencing European sovereign yields.
Our results show that, in the first phase of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, between
12% and 35% of the variations of Italian, Spanish, Irish and Portuguese bond yields were
due to shocks originating in Greece. Instead, in 2011 and 2012, when the sovereign yields
in Italy and Spain reached 6-7%, about 10% of the variations of the Spanish yields were
due to shocks originating in Italy, while about 5% of the variations of the Italian yields
were due to shocks originating in Spain. Furthermore, the spillovers from Italy to Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US were much larger than those from Spain.
Hence, our analysis confirms that shocks originating in Greece and Italy have contributed
to developments in sovereign spreads over the last 5 years, and suggest that shocks in
Spain have had a smaller impact.
Our results differ from some of the counter-intuitive results obtained with GIRFs. For
example, we find that the connectedness of the Greek markets decreased in 2009 and
2010. Conversely, Claeys and Vasˇ´ıcˇek [2014] find that connectedness increased during the
crisis. The discrepancy can be traced to the different specification of the model, as they
use common factors from sovereign yield spreads in a Factor Augmented VAR, and in this
model a large part of the contemporaneous spillovers between countries will be absorbed
by the principal component.1
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
methodology and shows the performance of our method relative to GIRFs using Monte
Carlo simulations. Section 3.3 presents the data and the empirical model. Section 3.4
1It can be shown that including principal components in a VAR may produce biased results.
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describes the results and provides some robustness checks. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Econometric methodology
3.2.1 SVAR setup
A Structural Vector Auto-Regressive model (SVAR) can be written as:
A0yt = A1yt−1 + A2yt−1 + ...+ AKyt−K +Bεt, (3.2.1)
where yt is the N × 1 vector of endogenous variables, K is a finite number of lags,
and the structural shocks εt are assumed to be white noise, N (0, IN). A0 describes the
contemporaneous relations between the variables, while matrices Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . , K
describe the dynamic relationships. The diagonal matrix B contains the standard errors
of the structural shocks.
The system (3.2.1) implies a following structural moving average representation, yt =
B(L)εt, where B(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator. The system in (3.2.1) cannot be
estimated directly, but needs to be estimated in its reduced form:
yt = A
∗
1yt−1 + A
∗
2yt−1 + ...+ A
∗
Pyt−K + ut, (3.2.2)
where ut = A
−1
0 Bεt and A
∗
k = A
−1
0 Ak for k ∈ [1, 2, ..., K].
The moving average representation of (3.2.2) is yt = C(L)ut. Therefore, the reduced
form response function, C(L), is related to the structural impulse response function by
B(L) = A0C(L). In other words, to identify the structural shocks and obtain the struc-
tural impulse responses, we need to identify A0.
Defining S = A−10 B, A0 must be such that Σu = SS
′, where Σu is the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form errors. The decomposition Σu = SS
′ is not unique.
For any H such that HH ′ = I, the matrix SH also satisfies this condition. In this case,
SH(SH)′ = SHH ′S ′ = SS ′ = Σu. Therefore, starting from any arbitrary S˜ such that
Σu = S˜S˜
′, such as the Cholesky decomposition of Σu, alternative decompositions can be
found by post-multiplying by any H satisfying HH ′ = I.
Once such an H matrix is selected and the corresponding shocks are identified, one
can compute the h-step ahead forecast error:
yt+h − Etyt+h =
h−1∑
τ=0
Cτ S˜Hεt+h−τ . (3.2.3)
Denoting by ψi,j,h the (i, j)
th element of the orthogonalized impulse response coefficient
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matrix C(L)S˜H at horizon h, the h-step ahead forecast error variance of variable i is:
ς2i (h) =
h−1∑
τ=0
(ψ2i,1,τ + ψ
2
i,2,τ + ...+ ψ
2
i,K,τ ), (3.2.4)
while (ψ2i,j,0+ψ
2
i,j,1+...+ψ
2
i,j,h−1) provides the contribution of shock j to the h-step forecast
error variance of variable i. Hence, the percentage contribution of shock j to the h-step
forecast error variance of variable i is:
ω2i,j(h) =
(ψ2i,j,0 + ψ
2
i,j,1 + ...+ ψ
2
i,j,h−1)
ς2i (h)
(3.2.5)
3.2.2 Measuring connectedness
Following Diebold and Yılmaz [2014], we measure spillovers and connectedness by means
of the FEVD. The FEVD is an adjacency matrix that defines a directed weighted network.2
The connectedness table, shown in Table 3.1, describes how the adjacency matrix captures
connectedness.
Table 3.1: Connectedness Table
ε1 ε2 · · · εN From Others
y1 ω
2
1,1(h) ω
2
1,2(h) · · · ω21,N(h) 1N−1
N∑
j=1
ω21,j(h), j 6= 1
y2 ω
2
2,1(h) ω
2
2,2(h) · · · ω22,N(h) 1N−1
N∑
j=1
ω22,j(h), j 6= 2
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
yN ω
2
N,1(h) ω
2
N,2(h) · · · ω2N,N(h) 1N−1
N∑
j=1
ω2N,j(h), j 6= N
To Others 1
N−1
N∑
i=1
ω2i,1(h)
1
N−1
N∑
i=1
ω2i,2(h) · · · 1N−1
N∑
i=1
ω2i,N(h)
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
ω2i,j(h)
i 6= 1 i 6= 2 i 6= N i 6= j
The upper-leftN×N block contains the FEVD at horizon h. The off-diagonal elements
describe pairwise directional connectedness measures from market j to market i, CHi←j =
ω2i,j(h). The network is weighted, ω
2
i,j(h) ∈ [0, 1], and directed, CHi←j 6= CHi→j.3 The
diagonal elements define a market’s own connectedness, CHj↔j = ω
2
j,j(h).
The aggregate connectedness statistics are obtained by taking row and column sums
of the off-diagonal elements. Total directional connectedness from market j to other
2For more details see Diebold and Yılmaz [2014].
3In an unweighted network ωi,j is either 1 or 0, so that the adjacency matrix only specifies whether a
relation exists or not, but does not specify the strength of the relation. In an undirected network relations
are symmetric, CHi←j = C
H
i→j .
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countries is defined as:
CH•←j =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
i 6=j
ω2i,j(h) (3.2.6)
In other words, CH•←j is the sum of the j-th column elements of the FEVD except its own
share, ω2j,j(h). This connectedness ‘to others’ provides the average share of the h-step
forecast-error variance explained by shock j and, therefore, it summarizes the importance
of shocks in country j in inducing fluctuations in all other markets.4
Similarly, by taking sums over rows, a total directional connectedness to market i from
all shocks can be constructed:
CHi←• =
1
N − 1
N∑
j=1
i 6=j
ω2i,j(h) (3.2.7)
CHi←• gives the average share of the h-step forecast-error variance of market i coming from
shocks originating from all other markets. Finally, total connectedness is:
CH =
1
N
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
i 6=j
ω2i,j(h) (3.2.8)
Similarly, for S ⊂ {1, . . . , N},
CHi,j∈S =
1
NS
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
i 6=j
ω2i,j(h) (3.2.9)
measures total connectedness among a subset of markets, for example only euro area
countries.
3.2.3 Magnitude restrictions
Having discussed the computation of connectedness, spillovers and contagion measures
for a given matrix H, it still remains to identify the structural shocks. In order to obtain
partial identification of the system, we impose restrictions on the size of contemporaneous
spillovers.
Let ψˆij be the instantaneous response of variable i to shock j and ψˆjj the instantaneous
response of variable j to the structural shock j. We identify the orthogonal structural
shock in market j, εj, by assuming that |ψˆij| < |ψˆjj| ∀ i 6= j. Intuitively, this assumption
implies that the contemporaneous spillovers to other markets from shock εj are smaller
4Compared to Diebold and Yılmaz [2014], we prefer to scale ‘to others’ connectedness by N − 1,
because this statistic is bounded in the interval [0, 1] and it is easier to interpret. We adopt the same
scaling for ‘from others’ connectedness.
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than the direct effect of shock εj on market j.
It is very easy to implement such restrictions in principle. For a given H we obtain an
estimate of A0, denoted Aˆ0, which gives us the impact response matrix Aˆ
−1
0 Bˆ. With the
diagonal elements of Aˆ0 normalized to 1, the non-diagonal elements can be written as:
aˆij =
ψˆij
ψˆjj
(3.2.10)
Hence our identifying restriction is that |aˆij| < 1 ∀ i 6= j. Thus for each H, we keep
the corresponding estimate of the IRFs and FEVD only if the resulting Aˆ0 satisfies the
restrictions on the size of spillover effects.
3.2.4 Estimation algorithm
The estimation procedure consists of three steps. In the first step, the reduced form VAR
model is estimated. In the second step, the structural shocks are identified taking into
account identification uncertainty. In the third step, estimation uncertainty is taken into
account. Formally, the steps are:
1. Estimate reduced-form VAR: Given a chosen number of lags, K̂, a V AR(K̂) is
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to obtain an estimate of autoregressive
coefficients A∗(L) and of the variance-covariance of reduced form errors, Σ̂u.
2. Identification restrictions: The reduced form impulse response function, C(L), is
related to the structural impulse response function via B(L) = A0C(L) and reduced
form errors, ut, are related to structural shocks as ut = A
−1
0 Bεt. The impact matrix,
S = A−10 B, must satisfy:
Σu = SS
′ (3.2.11)
We distinguish the approach used in small systems, with few variables, and larger
ones.5
Small systems :
(a) The initial estimate of Sˆ is obtained by a Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of reduced form errors, ˆ˜S = chol(Σˆu), giving an
initial estimate of the impulse response function is ˆ˜B(L) = Cˆ(L) ˆ˜S.
(b) A q× q matrix P is drawn from standard normal distribution, N (0, 1) and the
QR decomposition of P is derived. Note that P = QR and QQ′ = I.
5Different approaches are used only because of computational convenience. While randomly draw-
ing orthonormal matrices using the QR decomposition is faster when only a small number of variables
are used, numerical optimization becomes necessary when the number of variables is large because the
probability of obtaining a successful draw is decreasing with the size of the system.
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(c) The initial estimate of the impulse response function is post-multiplied by Q,
to obtain a candidate impulse response function Bˆ∗(L) = Cˆ(L) ˆ˜SQ.
(d) The steps 2b-2c are repeated until the candidate impulse responses, Bˆ∗(L),
satisfies the identifying restrictions.
Large systems :
(a) The problem is initialized as in step 2a above, with ˆ˜S = chol(Σˆu).
(b) A random matrix A∗0
−1 is drawn satisfying the identifying restrictions. In
particular, in the baseline estimation, we construct a matrix with 1s on the
diagonal and off-diagonal elements randomly drawn from [0, 1).
(c) Given A∗0
−1, the matrix Q∗ is defined through the following minimization prob-
lem:
Q∗ = argmin (Aˆ0
−1 − A∗0−1)2
subject to Q∗Q∗
′
= I
Sˆ = ˆ˜SQ∗
Aˆ0
−1
(i, j) = Sˆij/Sˆjj ∀ i, j
c(Aˆ0
−1
) ≥ 0
(3.2.12)
where c(.) ≥ 0 represents the identifying restrictions. In other words, we
look for an orthonormal matrix, Q∗, that implies a decomposition, Σˆu =
( ˆ˜SQ∗)( ˆ˜SQ∗)′, such that the resulting matrix of impact coefficients, Aˆ0
−1
, is
close to A∗0
−1, and satisfies the identifying restrictions.6
(d) In case the minimization does not converge to a feasible solution, steps 2b
and 2c are repeated. Once the minimization converges, the candidate impulse
response function is calculated as Bˆ∗(L) = Cˆ(L) ˆ˜SQ∗, and satisfies the restric-
tions by definition.
3. Estimation uncertainty: to account for estimation uncertainty, we repeat steps
1-2 1000 times, each time with a new artificially constructed data sample, Y ∗. To
construct data samples, we use re-sampling of errors. The new data sample is
constructed recursively as y∗t = Aˆ
∗
1y
∗
t−1 + ... + Aˆ
∗
Ny
∗
t−N + ût
∗, starting from initial
values [y0, ..., yN−1]. Aˆ∗n are the estimated reduced form autoregressive coefficients
and ût
∗ are drawn randomly, with replacement, from the estimated reduced form
errors, ût.
The point estimates and confidence bands are given by the median and relevant per-
centiles of the distribution of retained impulse response functions.
6Note that this minimization could be carried out without the matrix A∗0
−1, for example using a
constant objective function. However, the role of A∗0
−1 in our algorithm is to ensure that we search the
full space of permissible matrices, satisfying the identifying restrictions, in a more complete way.
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3.2.5 Comparison with alternative identification methods
The advantage of using magnitude restrictions over alternative methods can be appreci-
ated with a simple example. Consider a system with two variables, and let:
A−10 =
[
1 b
c 1
]
B =
[
σ1 0
0 σ2
]
so that
A−10 B =
[
σ1 bσ2
cσ1 σ2
]
Σu =
[
σ21 + b
2σ22 cσ
2
1 + bσ
2
2
cσ21 + bσ
2
2 c
2σ21 + σ
2
2
]
In case of zero restrictions, the estimated impact matrix obtained via Cholesky decompo-
sition of the variance-covariance matrix when the variables are ordered as [y1 y2] is:
Â−10 B
z
=
 √σ21 + b2σ22 0
cσ21+bσ
2
2√
c2σ21+σ
2
2
√
c2σ21 + σ
2
2 − (cσ
2
1+bσ
2
2)
2
σ21+bσ
2
2

Clearly Â−10 B
z
will coincide with the true A−10 B only when b = 0, namely when there
is no instantaneous spillover from market 2 to market 1. If the variables are ordered as
[y2 y1] it can be similarly shown that the estimated and true impact matrix will coincide
when c = 0.
The GIRFs for the first period are:
Â−10 B
g
=
 σ21+b2σ22√σ21+b2σ22 cσ21+bσ22√c2σ21+σ22
cσ21+bσ
2
2√
σ21+b
2σ22
c2σ21+σ
2
2√
c2σ21+σ
2
2

In this case Â−10 B
g
will coincide with the true A−10 B only when b = 0 and c = 0, namely
only when there are no instantaneous spillovers between markets. Since in general the off-
diagonal elements of Â−10 B
g
are non-zero, shocks identified with GIRFs are not orthogonal.
How big are the errors when measuring spillovers via GIRFs? To simplify, assume
that σ1 = xσ2, where x > 0. Then the GIRFs are:
Â−10 B
g
=
[
σ1
√
1 + c2x2 σ1b(1 + x
2)
[√
b2 + x2
]−1
σ1c(1 + x
2)
[√
1 + c2x2
]−1
σ1
√
b2 + x2
]
(3.2.13)
The true instantaneous impact of y2 on y1 is b. The estimated instantaneous impact is
bˆg = b(1+x2) [b2 + x2]
−1
. Figure C.1 shows the relationship between b and bˆg. The curved
area represents the instantaneous impact obtained by using GIRFs, the transparent grey
areas represents the bounds implied by the absolute magnitude restrictions, while the red
area represents the true b.
Notice that bˆg = 0 when b = 0. However, when the standard deviations of the shocks
differ substantially, for example when x = 0.1 so that the standard deviation of the
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shock from y2 is ten times that from y1, the estimated instantaneous impact using GIRFs
can reach 4, while the true instantaneous impact is close to zero. On the other hand,
the absolute magnitude restrictions are designed such that the estimated instantanous
impact cannot exceed one in absolute value. Nevertheless, bˆg is inside the transparent
grey areas for certain parameters, meaning that the estimates from the GIRFs satisfy
the absolute magnitude restrctions, which implies that the results obtained with the two
methodologies in these specific cases may not differ considerably.
Figure C.2 shows the root square error of the estimated instantaneous impact when us-
ing GIRFs (red area) and when using absolute magnitude restrictions (blue area). Again,
the difference is most pronounced when the standard deviations of shocks differ substan-
tially.
It is useful to anticipate that in the empirical section we find that the spillover from
Italian to Greek sovereign yields is more than one when using GIRFs. The numerical
example would suggest that this may be due to the standard deviation of shocks to Greek
sovereign yields being considerably higher.
3.2.6 Monte Carlo simulations
To extend the results of the simple example shown above, we compare the results of our
methodology to those of GIRFs using a Monte Carlo simulation. We use multiple models
to simulate a time-varying model.7 Specifically, data for four markets are simulated using
the following SVAR:
Am0 y
m
t = A
m
1 y
m
t−1 +B
mεmt ,
ymt = (A
m
0 )
−1Am1 y
m
t−1 + (A
m
0 )
−1Bmεmt ,
(3.2.14)
where m = 1, 2, ...,M denotes the model.
We model a time-varying data generating process by assuming that impact matrices,
Am0 , and the standard errors of the shocks, B
m, are not constant. In the baseline exercise
the non-diagonal entries of (Am0 )
−1 are randomly selected from the interval [−0.99, 0.99],
while diagonal entries equal one.8 The diagonal entries of matrix Bm, which give the stan-
dard errors of structural shocks, are also selected randomly from a uniform distribution
U [0.05, 0.45]. We simulate the data across models assuming that Am1 remains constant,
7We simulate a time-varying model because a rolling window estimation is carried out in the empirical
section.
8In order to better replicate empirical regularities with simulated data, we model the non-diagonal
entries of (Am0 )
−1 in the following way. Every element ai,j is a sum of three components. The first
component serves to replicate the fact that total connectedness is changing over time, therefore we model
it as a process ranging from 0 to 0.49. The second component serves to capture the fact that ‘to others’
connectedness is volatile over time - we model this by adding country specific shocks drawn from the
uniform distribution U [−0.35, 0.35] to every column of matrix (Am0 )−1. The last component is drawn
from the uniform distribution U [−0.15, 0.15] and added to all non-diagonal elements and serves as an
idiosyncratic component.
104
Chapter 3. Spillovers during Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis
that is Am1 = A1 ∀ m.
Using this simulated data, we compare the results from our identification scheme with
those obtained using GIRFs. The auto-regressive parameters in Am1 and the variance-
covariance matrix, Σm, are estimated using OLS and the small sample distribution of
parameters is obtained using bootstrap methods.
The performance of the identification schemes can be compared by using the root
mean squared error (RMSE) of different statistics. The RMSE of the estimates of the
IRFs is:
RMSE(irf) =
√√√√ 1
N2
1
H
1
M
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
H∑
h=1
M∑
m=1
(
¯ˆ
Ψi,j,h,m −Ψi,j,h,m
)2
(3.2.15)
where Ψi,j,h,m is the true IRF of variable i to the shock j at horizon h for the model m,
and
¯ˆ
Ψi,j,h,m is its median estimated counterpart.
9 The RMSE of estimated ‘to others’
connectedness is:
RMSE(to others) =
√√√√ 1
N
1
H
1
M
N∑
j=1
H∑
h=1
M∑
m=1
(
¯ˆ
Ch,m•←j − Ch,m•←j
)2
(3.2.16)
where Ch,m•←j is ‘to others’ connectedness for shock j at horizon h obtained from the model
m, and
¯ˆ
Ch,m•←j is its median estimated counterpart. Finally, the MSE of estimated grand
average connectedness is:
RMSE(grand average) =
√√√√ 1
H
1
M
H∑
h=1
M∑
m=1
(
¯ˆ
Ch,m − Ch,m
)2
(3.2.17)
where Ch,m is total connectedness at horizon h obtained from the model m, and
¯ˆ
Ch,m is
its median estimated counterpart.
Table 3.2 reports the RMSE of the magnitude restrictions, GIRFs and zero restrictions
with random ordering, which were also employed by Diebold and Yılmaz [2014]. In the
first 10 periods, on average, the RMSE of the IRF estimates is almost 2 times smaller
when using magnitude restrictions relative to GIRFs. Magnitude restrictions are also
better than zero restrictions using a random ordering.
Figure C.3 shows directional connectedness ‘to others’ from all four markets for the
first 10 models.10 Our methodology performs reasonably well, as the true directional
connectedness ‘to others’ is mostly included in the two-standard error bands. The same
cannot be said for the estimates obtained using GIRFs, shown in Figure C.4: the true
9To calculate RMSE we simulate 1000 different models and each model is estimated from 200 samples.
10We show only the first 10 models to simplify the presentation, the figures for other models can be
provided on request.
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Table 3.2: The relative root mean squared error (RMSE) of the estimates for different
identification methodologies
Magnitude res. GIRF Zero res. (random order)
horizon 1 1-10 1 1-10 1 1-10
IRFs 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07
TO connectedness 0.23 0.12 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.21
Grand Average 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.11
directional connectedness ‘to others’ is mostly outside the two-standard error bands. The
RMSE of the estimated directional connectedness ‘to others’ is around 50 percent smaller
when using magnitude restrictions as compared to GIRFs, as shown in Table 3.2.
Estimates of total connectedness differ little across methodologies: as shown in Figures
C.5 and C.6, estimates obtained using magnitude restrictions are still closer to the true
total connectedness, but the gain in precision in terms of RMSE is now less than 20
percent.
It is also interesting to explore how magnitude restrictions would perform when esti-
mates obtained via GIRFs and the true model coincide. In Section 3.2.5 we showed that,
theoretically, they coincide only when there are no contemporaneous spillovers between
markets. To see how magnitude restrictions perform when there are no spillovers, we
repeat the baseline exercise now setting the non-diagonal entries of (Am0 )
−1 to zero, with
diagonal entries still equal to one. Table 3.3 reports the RMSE of magnitude restrictions,
GIRFs and zero restrictions with random ordering. Clearly, estimates obtained by GIRFs
and zero restrictions are more precise since the identification restrictions coincide with the
true model, and the errors are only due to small sample estimation errors. Nonetheless,
magnitude restrictions perform reasonably well. The RMSE of the IRF estimates, 0.01,
and of the estimated directional connectedness ‘to others’, 0.06, are smaller than in the
general case. The estimates of total connectedness obtained with magnitude restrictions
are, however, biased when actual total connectedness is zero.11
To summarize, if the focus is only on total connectedness, the different identification
approaches produce similar results. However, whenever we are interested in less aggregate
statistics, such as bilateral relations between countries or the importance of a specific
shock, using magnitude restrictions produces more precise estimates.
11To understand this result, set σ1 = σ2 = 1 in the example from Section 3.2.5. It can be shown
that when b = c = 0, there are at least two candidate impact matrices that are consistent with the
magnitude restrictions. First with bˆ = cˆ = 0, and second with bˆ = −cˆ. In the second case, the estimate
of connectedness is not equal to zero, implying it is biased when the true model is such that b = c = 0.
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Table 3.3: The root mean squared error (RMSE) of the estimates for different identifica-
tion methodologies - model with no spillovers
Magnitude res. GIRF Zero res. (random order)
horizon 1 1-10 1 1-10 1 1-10
IRFs 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
TO connectedness 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
Grand Average 0.21 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
3.3 Data and specification of the VAR
The measures of spillovers and connectedness depend on the set of variables whose con-
nectedness is to be examined, the predictive horizon H, the VAR model adopted and its
dynamics, A(L).
Given the importance of spillovers during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, we apply
our method to study the transmission of shocks in the sovereign debt market of ten euro
area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain), the UK and the US. Monetary policy rates in the three economies
are also included in order to control for other domestic and foreign shocks that shape the
yield curves.
The sovereign yields we use are the 10-year benchmark rates provided by Reuters. The
monetary policy rates are the 3-month Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rates provided by
Reuters for the euro area and the US, and Thomson DataStream for the UK. An OIS uses
an overnight rate index, such as the EONIA for euro-denominated products, the SONIA
for sterling-denominated products or the Federal Funds Rate for US dollar-denominated
products. The OIS rates, at short maturities, are good indicators of the monetary policy
stance. The data is daily, running from January 2005 to August 2014. The policy rates
are treated as ‘fast moving’ variables to absorb common effects on bond markets.
The predictive horizon H is important because spillovers and connectedness measures
are time dependent. Following Diebold and Yılmaz [2014] we focus on a medium-run
horizon of H = 12 days, although in the online appendix we also present results on a
short-run horizon of H = 2 days.
To provide a sense of the time variation present in the data, we follow Diebold and
Yılmaz [2014] and estimate the VAR using a rolling window of 200 days. VAR is estimated
in levels with a constant and the lag length of the VAR is selected using the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC).
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3.4 Results
To identify the shock specific to market j, we assume that (i) the instantaneous response
of the sovereign yield in country j is larger in absolute value than the instantaneous
response of sovereign yields in country i and (ii) monetary policy rates do not react
contemporaneously to sovereign yield shocks, while monetary policy shocks contempo-
raneously affect sovereign yields. In other words, we assume that monetary policy does
not respond to yield shocks, but short-term monetary policy rates are one of the driving
forces of sovereign yields.
We proceed in two steps. In Section 3.4.1, we show the full-sample (static) connected-
ness analysis, which sets the stage for Section 3.4.2, where we carry out the rolling-sample
(dynamic) analysis. In Section 3.4.3, we use a counter-factual exercise to disentangle the
importance of contagion versus the role of shocks in explaining connectedness. Finally,
Section 3.4.4 discusses how the results would differ using GIRF analysis.
3.4.1 Full-sample analysis
Table 3.4 shows the connectedness table for the full-sample. The table shows the pair-
wise directional connectedness between markets obtained using the magnitude restriction
method. The numbers in brackets show those obtained using GIRFs.
The diagonal elements, showing ‘own connectedness’, tend to be the largest individual
elements of the table. As expected, ‘own connectedness’ is particularly large for monetary
policy rates. Conversely, ‘own connectedness’ is relatively smaller for sovereign yield
shocks in France (25%), the UK (18%), the Netherlands (30%) and the US (35%). The
government yields of these countries are mostly affected by developments in monetary
policy rates or sovereign yields in other markets.
Total connectedness of the asset markets amounts to 51%.12 This means that, on
average, 51% of the variance of sovereign yields in the sample can be explained by shocks
to foreign sovereign yields and monetary policy rates.
Some blocks of high pairwise directional connectedness exist, especially from German
yields to the sovereign yields of Austria (15%), the Netherlands (27%), France (17%), the
UK (24%) and the US (17%). Note that Austrian and Dutch sovereign yields do have
an important influence on the German Bund (both at 14%). In general, the sovereign
markets of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands are highly inter-connected, and the
same is true for the markets of Italy and Spain, as well as France and Belgium.
It is useful to point out that UK and US sovereign yields have limited explanatory
power in the developments of the euro area sovereign yields. Moreover, the column average
of all pairwise connectedness measures corresponding to UK and US sovereign yields
12Total connectedness of the asset markets includes the spillovers from monetary policy to sovereign
yields, but excludes the spillovers in the other direction.
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Table 3.4: Full sample connectedness table at horizon 12 business days
USm EAm UKm DE AT NL BE FR IT SP IR PT GR UK US FROM
USm 99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(77) (2) (1) (3) (1) (3) (2) (3) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (2) (3) (2)
EAm 5 92 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(4) (69) (3) (7) (3) (4) (1) (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (4) (1) (2)
UKm 2 4 91 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
(2) (4) (79) (3) (1) (2) (1) (3) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (5) (0) (2)
DE 5 5 1 45 14 14 2 5 1 1 1 1 0 3 2 5
(1) (1) (0) (21) (14) (18) (8) (14) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (12) (8) (6)
AT 3 4 1 15 42 10 7 8 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 5
(1) (1) (0) (12) (23) (15) (13) (16) (3) (3) (1) (0) (0) (8) (5) (6)
NL 5 5 1 27 17 30 4 5 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 5
(1) (1) (0) (16) (15) (21) (10) (15) (1) (2) (1) (0) (0) (10) (7) (6)
BE 4 2 1 6 15 6 41 8 5 3 3 1 2 2 2 5
(1) (0) (0) (7) (14) (10) (25) (16) (8) (7) (3) (1) (0) (4) (3) (5)
FR 5 4 1 17 20 10 9 25 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 6
(1) (1) (0) (12) (16) (15) (13) (21) (4) (3) (1) (0) (0) (8) (5) (6)
IT 1 0 0 2 4 4 9 4 43 16 3 3 4 3 2 5
(0) (0) (0) (0) (5) (2) (13) (7) (38) (23) (5) (4) (1) (0) (0) (4)
SP 1 0 0 2 5 3 4 4 15 44 4 3 6 3 3 5
(0) (0) (0) (1) (6) (3) (9) (7) (21) (40) (7) (4) (2) (1) (1) (4)
IR 1 0 0 2 3 3 4 2 4 6 53 7 6 4 4 4
(0) (0) (0) (1) (3) (2) (7) (3) (4) (8) (58) (10) (3) (1) (1) (3)
PT 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 4 4 8 61 10 2 2 3
(0) (0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (5) (1) (7) (7) (15) (57) (6) (0) (0) (3)
GR 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 91 0 0 1
(0) (0) (0) (1) (0) (0) (3) (0) (7) (4) (5) (5) (74) (0) (0) (2)
UK 3 3 3 24 8 9 3 4 2 2 2 1 1 28 5 6
(1) (1) (1) (17) (11) (14) (6) (11) (0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (26) (11) (5)
US 7 1 0 17 6 6 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 7 35 5
(2) (1) (0) (14) (9) (12) (5) (9) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (14) (34) (5)
TO 2 2 0 7 6 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 51
(1) (1) (1) (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (4) (4) (3) (2) (1) (5) (3) (56)
indicates that total directional connectedness ‘to others’ is only 2%. The sovereign yield
with the largest influence on other markets is the German Bund (7% on average).
3.4.2 Rolling-sample analysis
Moving to the rolling window estimation, we start by presenting, in Figure C.7, the
estimated standard deviation of the shocks to sovereign yields for each 200-day rolling-
sample windows. The shocks to yields on sovereign bonds issued by Germany, Austria,
the Netherlands, Belgium, France, the UK and the US were small and relatively stable
over the sample. Conversely, the shocks originating in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy
and Spain have been changing over time, and were at times very large.
Overall, the dynamics of the shocks obtained with our method are in line with anecdo-
tal evidence. For example, at their peak, the size of the shock to sovereign yields is largest
in Greece, followed by Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In addition, the dynamics of
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the shocks matches the conventional wisdom: there are large shocks in Greece in 2010,
resulting in the EU Commission/ECB/IMF program, and 2012, due to the credit event
on Greek sovereign debt. There are similarly large shocks in Italy and Spain in 2011 and
2012, due to fears of euro area break-up. However, our method also shows a rising trend
for all euro area shocks since the crisis in inter-bank markets in August 2007, which also
led to shocks to the UK and US sovereign yields at the end of 2007.
Total connectedness
Total connectedness is plotted in Figures C.8 and C.9. Figure C.8 is constructed using all
shocks to sovereign yields and monetary policy rates and, hence, shows the overall degree
of connectedness among short-term money market rates and long-term sovereign yields.
Figure C.9 is constructed using shocks to sovereign yields only, and therefore measures
the degree of connectedness among long-term sovereign yields.
Over the period January 2005 to September 2009, total connectedness among sovereign
yields was very volatile and ranged between 60% and 78% according to our results. Total
connectedness declined steadily from 77% in October 2009 to 56% at the beginning of
2013. It then increased steadily, returning to pre-crisis levels in 2014.
These dynamics reflect developments in the euro area sovereign debt market. In fact,
as Figure C.10 shows, total connectedness among euro area sovereign yields is due to
shocks to the euro area sovereign yields only. Total cross-border connectedness among
euro area countries declined steadily since October 2009. The negative trend in connect-
edness was particularly notable from the beginning of 2011 until the summer of 2012,
when the fears of the break-up of the euro area exacerbated the financial crisis. At that
time, policy makers pointed to financial fragmentation as one of the main causes for the
impairment of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Connectedness among
euro area countries has increased steadily since the beginning of 2013. The degree of con-
nectedness in 2014 is similar to the level recorded before the financial crisis, suggesting
that financial fragmentation in the euro area sovereign debt market has seized to be a key
issue.
Total directional connectedness
Total directional connectedness among the euro area, the UK and US is plotted in Figures
C.11 and Figure C.12. The former combines region specific shocks to sovereign yields and
monetary policy rates; the latter focuses on the effects of shocks to sovereign yields only.
The plots on the diagonal provide the effects of domestic shocks.13
The results are revealing. First of all, during the sample period 2005-2014, the euro
13This is why the results from the euro area to itself, reported in Figure C.12, differ from those reported
in Figure C.10, where only the cross-border effects are taken into consideration.
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area as a whole is relatively insulated from foreign developments, given that about 80% of
the variance of the euro area yields can be explained by shocks originated within the euro
area. The US had been relatively more important for the euro area before the start of the
inter-bank market crisis: in 2006, the first half of 2007 and soon after at the end of 2007,
shocks from the US explained about 20 to 25% of variations in euro area sovereign yields.
Shocks from the UK can explain 5 to 10% of the variance of the euro area sovereign
yields, except in the period just after the bankruptcy of Lehman, when they explain
20% of the variance of euro area sovereign yields. Second, UK and US domestic shocks
affected their own economies in a range between 10 and 40% over the entire sample, while
sovereign yields of both countries are highly affected by shocks originating in the euro
area. Interestingly, Figure C.12 suggests that shocks to euro area sovereign yields, rather
than monetary policy shocks, are the driving force of variations in all economies sovereign
yields.
Figure C.13 shows the estimated total directional connectedness among countries’
sovereign yields due to shocks to sovereign yields stemming from specific countries. Each
country’s bond yield contributes to the variance of foreign sovereign yields by about 4
to 5% on average. However, there are specific developments in some periods, with larger
effects that are in line with conventional wisdom. For example, connectedness from Greece
doubled from 5% to 11% in the spring of 2010. Similarly, after the Deauville agreement on
Private Sector Involvement on 18 October 2010, when it was agreed that private investors
would share the burden of future defaults with the taxpayer, when sovereign yields in the
stressed euro area countries started to increase, our results reveal Ireland to be the key
source of spillovers, as connectedness from this market rose from 4% on average to 10%.
Similarly, when the risk of euro area break-up unfolded in 2011 and 2012, connectedness
from Italy rose from 3% in spring 2011 to 7% in the first half of 2012. Connectedness
from Italy further increased to 8% in the autumn of 2012 after Mario Draghi’s “whatever
it takes” speech on 26 July 2012 and the launch, in September 2012, of the Eurosystem’s
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) in secondary sovereign bond markets. Increased
connectedness after such a speech was a desired outcome as sovereign yields started a
steady decline. On the other hand, connectedness from Spain has been rather stable,
rising only marginally since the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. This
suggests that Italy, and not Spain, is a key source of systemic risk in the sovereign debt
markets in the euro area.
Finally, it is useful to note that there was an increase in connectedness from the
US in March 2009 and May 2013. In March 2009, the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) announced it would purchase 300 billion USD in long-term Treasury Bills, which
was subsequently expanded. The average spillover effect from the US rose from 4% in the
spring of 2010 to 8% in the summer. Since the FMOC announcement released on 22 May
2013, which financial markets perceived as the beginning of the end of accommodative
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monetary policy in the US, connectedness from the US rose sharply from 3% in May 2013
to 10% in March 2014.
Pairwise directional connectedness
Pairwise directional connectedness measures the effect of a specific shock on a specific
market. Given that we consider 15 markets, presenting such plots for each of the 210
pairwise directional measures is not feasible. Therefore, we present some relevant case
studies, looking at shocks originating in the US, Greece, Italy and Spain.
Figure C.14 shows connectedness from US sovereign yields to the sovereign yields of
other countries. Before the bankruptcy of Lehman about 10% of the variance of the US
yields is explained by its own shocks; thereafter, this share rose to 17%. As discussed in the
previous section, there is an increase in connectedness from the US after March 2009 and
May 2013. The sovereign yields most affected are those of the UK and Germany, followed
by Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. The stressed countries (Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Italy and Spain) were mildly influenced.
A key case study is Greece. Figure C.15 shows connectedness from the Greek sovereign
yields to the sovereign yields of all other markets. Before the sovereign debt crisis, when,
recalling Figure C.7), we saw that the shocks were relatively small, a Greek shock affected
its own sovereign yield marginally. Thereafter, the shocks become large and explain
40% of the variance of the Greek sovereign yields in 2010 and about 70% in 2013. The
sovereign yields most affected by the developments in Greece are, in order of magnitude,
Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain. Again, this is in line with conventional wisdom. Shocks
stemming from Greek sovereign yields in 2010 explain 30% of the variance of Portuguese
yields, 25% of the variance of Irish yields, 15% of the variance of Italian yields and 10%
of the variance of Spanish yields. Interestingly, the German Bund was also affected:
with the intensification of the crisis, international investors became more risk averse, and
demanded more liquid and relatively safer assets. After the 2010 peak, Greek shocks did
not spillover to the sovereign yields of the other stressed countries, except in March 2012
when Greece declared a credit event. In 2013, sovereign yields in Greece declined sharply.
Again, the countries positively affected by these developments were the stressed countries:
Portugal (30%), Italy (20%), Spain (15%) and Ireland (15%). There was a period in the
first half of 2013, with the peak in March 2013, when the Greek shocks also influenced
non-stressed economies, such as the UK (23%) and the US (19%). During that period, the
Greek sovereign yields declined from 23% in September 2012 to 10% in March 2013. This
large shock contributed to the decline in yields in the stress countries as well as in France,
Belgium and Austria and to an increase in yields, by a few basis points, in Germany,
the Netherlands, the UK and the US. This could be due to a portfolio reallocation as
international investors’ risk aversion receded.
Other interesting case studies are Italy and Spain. In 2011 and 2012 the shocks
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from Italy, shown in Figure C.16, spilled over to the sovereign yields in other countries,
contributing to a rise in Spain (16%) and, again due to a portfolio reallocation, a decline
in Belgium (9%), Germany (8%), the Netherlands (7%), the UK (9%) and the US (7%).14
In 2012, the “whatever-it-takes” speech reversed the dynamics of Italian sovereign yields.
They started to decline quickly, contributing to the decline in Spanish sovereign yields,
but with the opposite effect on the UK and the US Treasuries. Conversely, the shocks
stemming from Spanish sovereign yields have affected its own sovereign market and, only
to a limited extent, the developments in Italian sovereign yields, as shown in Figure C.17.
All other sovereigns did not record a significant change in the contribution of Spanish
sovereign yields shocks.
Spillover effects
The key input for the analysis carried out in the previous sections are the impulse response
functions. Given that we consider 15 markets and 46 rolling windows, presenting and
discussing 9660 IRFs is impractical. Here, we present a sub-set of IRFs between the
sovereign yields of the key countries (Greece, Italy, Germany, UK and US) over the two
specific sovereign crisis periods: the October 2009-July 2010 period and the May 2011-
April 2012 period.
As shown in Figure C.18, our results suggest that Greece played a key role in 2010,
driving up the sovereign yields in stressed countries and down those of non-stressed coun-
tries, including the United States. Instead, Italy became a source of volatility in the
second phase of the crisis, when financial markets were pricing in the risk of euro area
break-up. For example, during the May 2011-April 2012 period, according to our results,
a shock amounting to 100 basis points in Italian sovereign yields implied an increase in
Spanish sovereign yields equal to 55 basis points, and at peak, after 20 days, an increase
in Greek and Portuguese sovereign yields by 300 and 40 basis points respectively.15 At
the same time, flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-safety phenomena drove down the German
Bund, the British Guilt and the US Treasury yields by 15 basis points.
It is also interesting to note that US shocks clearly spilled over to Germany in 2010, but
not in 2011-2012. In the latter period, the euro area sovereign debt crisis was exacerbated,
and so spillovers within the euro area became more important. These results further justify
the relevance of the time-varying analysis of such shocks.
3.4.3 What drives changes in connectedness?
Network connectedness, spillover and contagion are sometimes used interchangeably in
the literature. In this paper, we have defined them as follows:
14All figures refer to peak effects.
15Results for Spain and Portugal are not shown but available upon request.
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• Connectedness:
Ω(h) = f(Φ(A1, ..., AN), A
−1
0 , B)
Connectedness is constructed using the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
(FEVD), which is non-linear function of the dynamic effects of shocks, Φ(A1, ..., AN),
the matrix of contemporaneous effects, A−10 , and the size of the shocks, B.
• Spillovers:
Ψ(h) = Φ(A1, ..., AN)A
−1
0 B
Spillovers are measured using the IRFs, which are a non-linear function of the
dynamic effects, Φ(A1, ..., AN), the matrix of contemporaneous effects, A
−1
0 , and
the size of the shocks, B. While connectedness is always positive, spillovers can be
positive or negative.
• Contagion:
Υ(h) = Φ(A1, ..., AN)A
−1
0
As in Forbes and Rigobon [2002], contagion is related to the structure of the econ-
omy and is captured using the dynamic effects, Φ(A1, ..., AN), and the matrix of
contemporaneous effects, A−10 .
In this subsection, we disentangle connectedness due to contagion from that due to
shocks using a counter-factual exercise. Let Ω(h)w denote the estimate of total connected-
ness in sample w. Consider the pre-crisis estimates of (i) dynamic effects, Φ(AP1 , ..., A
P
N),
(ii) the matrix of contemporaneous effects, A−1P0 , and (iii) the size of the shocks, B
P ,
where superscript P stands for the estimates from the pre-crisis sample. We can then
construct the following three measures of connectedness in a sample w:
• The unconditional effect through both contagion and shocks: Ω(h)w = f(Υw, Bw)
• The effect of contagion given the pre-crisis size of shocks: Ω(h)w,BP = f(Υw, BP )
• The effect of shocks given the pre-crisis degree of market linkages (i.e. given this
degree of contagion): Ω(h)w,Υ
P
= f(ΥP , Bw)
In other words, to construct Ω(h)w,B
P
, we fix the distribution of the shocks to that
estimated from the pre-crisis period, Bw = BP ∀ w . More specifically, we fix Bw to the
estimate obtained in the first sample of the rolling window estimation using data from
3rd January 2005 to 7th October 2005, Bw = B1 ∀ w. The changes in connectedness,
as measured by Ω(h)w,B
P
, are therefore only due to changes in cross-market linkages or
contagion. Similarly to construct Ω(h)w,Υ
P
, we fix the degree of contagion to the estimate
from the pre-crisis period, Υw = ΥP ∀ w. The changes in connectedness in this case are
only due to the changes in the distribution of the shocks. Finally, we can compare those
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estimates with baseline connectedness measures that takes into account both changes, in
contagion and in the distribution of shocks, Ω(h)w.
Figure C.19 applies the decomposition to total connectedness among sovereign yields
due to shocks to sovereign yields. The black line (‘Grand Average’) is total connectedness
as reported in Figure C.9. The green line is the median estimate of total connectedness
when contagion is fixed to the pre-crisis level. When keeping the cross-market linkages
fixed, total connectedness increases after 2009 due to the size of shocks that have affected
the euro area sovereign debt market. The red line is the median estimate of total con-
nectedness when the distribution of shocks is fixed to the pre-crisis level. The drop in
total connectedness is due to the decline in cross-market linkages and this is associated
to market fragmentation, which has characterized the euro area government debt market
between 2009 and 2012 with the intensification of the sovereign debt crisis.
While the shocks originated in the stressed euro area countries, such as Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal and Spain, the change in cross-market linkages was a common phe-
nomenon. Financial fragmentation increased across stressed euro area countries, shown in
Figure C.20, as well as among core countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, shown in Figure C.21. However, total connectedness within stressed
countries and within core countries increased, which shows that market fragmentation
was especially severe between the two blocks.
3.4.4 What does traditional identification tell us about sovereign
bond markets linkages?
The key issue of using GIRFs is that the resulting shocks are not orthogonal, and might
therefore be incorrect. For example, during the October 2009-July 2010 period, the
effect of shocks stemming from Italy on Greek sovereign yields turn out to be positive
using GIRFs and negative using our method (see Figure C.18). The impact of GIRFs is
sometime even larger than unity: during the October 2009-July 2010 period, an Italian
shock amounting to 100 basis points identified using GIRFs implies an average increase
by 400 basis points in Greek sovereign yields, by 210 basis points in Portuguese sovereign
yields and by 150 basis points in Irish sovereign yields. These results are counter-intuitive,
given that Greece is believed to be the source of the crisis during this period.
The shocks estimated using GIRFs always overestimate the size of the shocks compared
to our method. Moreover, in the period before the start of the crisis in the inter-bank
market in August 2007, the size of the shocks identified using GIRFs exhibited a clear
declining trend in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy and Spain.
Similarly, during the periods preceding both the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008
and the euro area sovereign debt crisis in October 2009, the estimated shocks on the
sovereign yields exhibit trends that were steeper than those suggested by our method.
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These differences are then reflected in all the relevant measures of connectedness.
The results obtained using absolute magnitude restrictions and GIRFs differ substan-
tially if connectedness is generated by shocks to long-term sovereign yields only, before
the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in October 2009, due to the sizeable influence of
monetary policy rates on sovereign yields, which we have been able to disentangle from
sovereign yield shocks (see Figure C.9). Since October 2009, the two methods produced
very similar results, owing to the relatively marginal impact that the monetary policy
rates have had on sovereign yields, given that they have remained stable at very low
levels.
The results obtained using absolute magnitude restrictions and GIRFs are generally
different when looking at total directional connectedness (see Figure C.13). For example,
connectedness estimated using GIRFs from Greece declined in 2009 and 2010, in contrast
with conventional wisdom.
3.5 Conclusion
Structural shock identification is a key issue in macroeconomics, and a challenging topic
in finance in particular since asset prices move sharply and simultaneously. Diebold and
Yılmaz [2014] use the GIRF method to investigate spillovers and connectedness. However,
it is a well known fact that shocks identified using GIRFs are not orthogonal, because
contemporaneous correlations are not addressed. This is very relevant if one wishes to
study the sources and directions of the spillovers.
We propose a new method, which identifies structural shocks in asset prices based on
restrictions on the relative size of the contemporaneous impact of the shocks in different
markets. The method imposes bounds on the impact matrix, but it remains agnostic
about the sign of the responses.
We first show analytically that the GIRF method does not provide identification of
structural shocks, and use a Monte Carlo simulation to show that the errors can be
important when using GIRFs. Conversely, the absolute magnitude restriction method is,
in most cases, much closer to the true value.
Second, we apply the method to the US and European sovereign yield markets. We
find that (i) the shocks estimated using GIRFs always overestimate the size of the shocks
compared to our method, (ii) the shocks estimated using GIRFs may present different
trends than those suggested by our method, (iii) the shocks estimated using GIRFs may
present more accelerated trends than those suggested by our method in crisis times.
We find that total cross-border connectedness among euro area countries declined
steadily between October 2009 and December 2012, in line with the policy makers’ view
that financial fragmentation was one of the main causes for the impairment of the trans-
mission mechanism of the monetary policy. Moreover, we find clear evidence that financial
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fragmentation has been a common phenomenon among stressed as well as core euro area
countries. Connectedness among euro area countries improved in 2013 and in 2014 reached
the level recorded before the financial crisis, suggesting that financial fragmentation in
the euro area sovereign debt market is no longer a key issue.
We also find that during the period 2005-2014, the euro area as a whole was relatively
more insulated from foreign developments, given that about 80% of the variance of the
euro area yields can be explained by shocks originated within the euro area. However, the
spillovers change over time. For example, in May 2013, when financial markets perceived
a potential change in the US monetary policy, the influence of US sovereign yields on the
developments in sovereign yields in other countries rose.
One of the key advantages of our method is that it can pin down the source of shocks.
For example, we find that in the first half of 2010 shocks stemming from Greek sovereign
yields could explain 30% of the variance of Portuguese yields, 25% of the variance of Irish
yields, 15% of the variance of Italian yields and 10% of the variance of Spanish yields.
Similarly, focusing on the 2011-2012 period, when financial markets were pricing in the
risk of a break-up of the euro area, our method suggests that Italy, and not Spain, was a
key source of systemic risk in the sovereign debt markets.
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Appendix C
Appendix: Spillovers during Euro
Area Sovereign Debt Crisis
C.1 Appendix - Absolute magnitude restrictions vs.
GIRF
Figure C.1: The estimated and the true spillover
The colored area present the estimated spillover, bˆ, obtained by GIRF. The red area area is the true spillover coeficient, b.
The gray bands represent the absolute magnitude restrictions on the interval (−1, 1).
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Figure C.2: The root squared error of estimated spillover by GIRF (red) and magnitude
res. (blue)
The red area present the graph presents the root squared error of estimated spillover (RSE) by GIRF, while blue area
presents the RSE of estimated spillover by absolute magnitude restrictions.
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C.2 Monte Carlo results
Figure C.3: Estimated directional connectedness ‘to’ others by using absolute magnitude
restrictions
The graph presents the estimated directional connectedness ‘to’ others for simulated markets. The red line is median
estimate and the gray bands are 95% error bands. Black line with circles is the true directional connectedness ‘to’ others.
Figure C.4: Estimated directional connectedness ‘to’ others by using generalized IRFs
The graph presents the estimated directional connectedness ‘to’ others for simulated markets. The red line is median
estimate and the gray bands are 95% error bands. Black line with circles is the true directional connectedness ‘to’ others.
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Figure C.5: Estimated total connectedness by using absolute magnitude restrictions
The graph presents the estimated total connectedness for simulated countries. The red line is median estimate and the gray
bands are 95% error bands. Black line with circles is the true directional connectedness ‘to’ others.
Figure C.6: Estimated total connectedness by using generalized IRFs
The graph presents the estimated total connectedness for simulated countries. The red line is median estimate and the gray
bands are 95% error bands. Black line with circles is the true directional connectedness ‘to’ others.
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C.3 Empirical results
Figure C.7: The estimated standard deviation of the shocks to sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. The vertical axis shows the standard deviation in percentage points. The first vertical bar denotes the beginning of
the crisis in the interbank market on 9 August 2007. The second vertical bar denotes Lehmans bankruptcy on 15 September
2008. The third vertical bar denotes the parliamentary speech by the new Greek Prime Minister disclosing the budget
situation in Greece on 16 October 2009. The fourth vertical bar denotes the Deauville agreement upon Private Sector
Involvement on 18 October 2010. The fifth vertical line denotes the launch of the 3-year LTROs on 8 December 2011. The
sixth vertical line denotes the Draghi speech in London on 26 July 2012.
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Figure C.8: Estimated total connectedness among sovereign yields and monetary policy
rates
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
Figure C.9: Estimated total connectedness among sovereign yields due to shocks to
sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
Figure C.10: Estimated total connectedness among euro area sovereign yields due to
shocks to euro area sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
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Figure C.11: Total connectedness among regions sovereign yields due to shocks to
sovereign yields and monetary policy rates
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
Figure C.12: Total connectedness among regions sovereign yields due to shocks to
sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
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Figure C.13: Total connectedness among countries sovereign yields due to shocks to
sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
Figure C.14: Estimated pairwise directional connectedness to countries sovereign yields
due to shocks to US sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
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Figure C.15: Estimated pairwise directional connectedness to countries sovereign yields
due to shocks to Greek sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
Figure C.16: Estimated pairwise directional connectedness to countries sovereign yields
due to shocks to Italian sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
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Figure C.17: Estimated pairwise directional connectedness to countries sovereign yields
due to shocks to Spanish sovereign yields
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF. For the description of dates marked by vertical bars see footnote in Figure C.7.
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Figure C.18: Selected impulse response functions for specific periods
The blue line is median estimate and the shaded area are 68% error bands. The red line is median estimate obtained by
GIRF.
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C.4 Contagion vs. the size of shocks
Figure C.19: Decomposition of total connectedness among sovereign yields
The black line is median estimate of total connectedness (grand average) for Eurozone countries and the shaded area are
68%error bands. The red line is median estimate of total connectedness (grand average) and red shaded area corresponding
68% error bands when the distribution of shocks is fixed to pre-crisis level. The green line is median estimate of total
connectedness (grand average) and green shaded area corresponding 68% error bands when the contagion is fixed to pre-
crisis level. We fix the distribution of shocks and contagion for all sovereign yields. Grand average is constructed from the
pairwise connectedness measures of all 12 countries except monetary rates.
Figure C.20: Decomposition of total connectedness among stressed countries
The black line is median estimate of total connectedness (grand average) between stressed Eurozone countries (Italy,
Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece) and the shaded area are 68%error bands. The red line is median estimate of total
connectedness (grand average) and red shaded area corresponding 68% error bands when the distribution of shocks is
fixed to pre-crisis level. The green line is median estimate of total connectedness (grand average) and green shaded area
corresponding 68% error bands when the contagion is fixed to pre-crisis level. We fix the distribution of the shocks and
contagion only for Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece. Grand average is constructed from the pairwise connectedness
measures of Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece.
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Figure C.21: Decomposition of total connectedness among core countries
The black line is median estimate of total connectedness (grand average) for core Eurozone countries (Germany, Austria,
Netherlands, Belgium and France) and the shaded area are 68%error bands. The red line is median estimate of total
connectedness (grand average) and red shaded area corresponding 68% error bands when the distribution of shocks is
fixed to pre-crisis level. The green line is median estimate of total connectedness (grand average) and green shaded area
corresponding 68% error bands when the contagion is fixed to pre-crisis level. We fix the distribution of the shocks and
contagion only for Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and France. Grand average is constructed from the pairwise
connectedness measures of Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium and France.
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